We Philologists, Volume 8 | Page 2

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche
spirit of a great past they will not have
been penned in vain.
J. M. KENNEDY.

LONDON, July 1911.

I
To what a great extent men are ruled by pure hazard, and how little
reason itself enters into the question, is sufficiently shown by observing
how few people have any real capacity for their professions and
callings, and how many square pegs there are in round holes: happy and
well chosen instances are quite exceptional, like happy marriages, and
even these latter are not brought about by reason. A man chooses his
calling before he is fitted to exercise his faculty of choice. He does not
know the number of different callings and professions that exist; he
does not know himself; and then he wastes his years of activity in this
calling, applies all his mind to it, and becomes experienced and
practical. When, afterwards, his understanding has become fully
developed, it is generally too late to start something new; for wisdom
on earth has almost always had something of the weakness of old age
and lack of vigour about it.
For the most part the task is to make good, and to set to rights as well
as possible, that which was bungled in the beginning. Many will come
to recognise that the latter part of their life shows a purpose or design
which has sprung from a primary discord: it is hard to live through it.
Towards the end of his life, however, the average man has become
accustomed to it--then he may make a mistake in regard to the life he
has lived, and praise his own stupidity: _bene navigavi cum naufragium
feci_ . he may even compose a song of thanksgiving to "Providence."
2
On inquiring into the origin of the philologist I find:
1. A young man cannot have the slightest conception of what the
Greeks and Romans were.
2. He does not know whether he is fitted to investigate into them;

3. And, in particular, he does not know to what extent, in view of the
knowledge he may actually possess, he is fitted to be a teacher. What
then enables him to decide is not the knowledge of himself or his
science; but
(a) Imitation.
(b) The convenience of carrying on the kind of work which he had
begun at school.
(c) His intention of earning a living.
In short, ninety-nine philologists out of a hundred should not be
philologists at all.
3
The more strict religions require that men shall look upon their activity
simply as one means of carrying out a metaphysical scheme: an
unfortunate choice of calling may then be explained as a test of the
individual. Religions keep their eyes fixed only upon the salvation of
the individual . whether he is a slave or a free man, a merchant or a
scholar, his aim in life has nothing to do with his calling, so that a
wrong choice is not such a very great piece of unhappiness. Let this
serve as a crumb of comfort for philologists in general; but true
philologists stand in need of a better understanding: what will result
from a science which is "gone in for" by ninety-nine such people? The
thoroughly unfitted majority draw up the rules of the science in
accordance with their own capacities and inclinations; and in this way
they tyrannise over the hundredth, the only capable one among them. If
they have the training of others in their hands they will train them
consciously or unconsciously after their own image . what then
becomes of the classicism of the Greeks and Romans?
The points to be proved are--
(a) The disparity between philologists and the ancients.

(b) The inability of the philologist to train his pupils, even with the help
of the ancients.
(c) The falsifying of the science by the (incapacity of the) majority, the
wrong requirements held in view; the renunciation of the real aim of
this science.
4
All this affects the sources of our present philology: a sceptical and
melancholy attitude. But how otherwise are philologists to be
produced?
The imitation of antiquity: is not this a principle which has been refuted
by this time?
The flight from actuality to the ancients: does not this tend to falsify
our conception of antiquity?
5
We are still behindhand in one type of contemplation: to understand
how the greatest productions of the intellect have a dreadful and evil
background . the sceptical type of contemplation. Greek antiquity is
now investigated as the most beautiful example of life.
As man assumes a sceptical and melancholy attitude towards his life's
calling, so we must sceptically examine the highest life's calling of a
nation: in order that we may understand what life is.
6
My words of consolation apply particularly to the
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