talent for making phrases, such 
qualities were of great assistance to him. But the real strength of the 
President lay rather in his gift of sensing what the common people 
wanted and his ability to put it into words for them. Few of his 
speeches are great; many of them are marred by tactless phrases, such 
as "too proud to fight" and "peace without victory." But nearly all of 
them express honestly the desires of the masses. His strength in New 
Jersey and the extraordinary effect produced in Europe by his war 
speeches might be cited as evidence of this peculiar power. He sought 
above everything to catch the trend of inarticulate rather than 
vociferous opinion. If one objects that his patience under German 
outrages was not truly representative, we must remember that opinion 
was slow in crystallizing, that his policy was endorsed by the election 
of 1916, and that when he finally advocated war in April, 1917, the 
country entered the struggle practically a unit. 
But it is obvious that, however much political strength was assured the 
President by his instinctive appreciation of popular feeling, this was 
largely offset by the gaucherie of his political tactics. He had a genius 
for alienating persons who should have supported him and who agreed 
in general with the broad lines of his policies. Few men in public life 
have so thoroughly aroused the dislike of "the man in the street." 
Admitting that much of Wilson's unpopularity resulted from 
misunderstanding, from the feeling that he was a different sort, perhaps 
a "highbrow," the degree of dislike felt for him becomes almost 
inexplicable in the case of a President who, from all the evidence, was 
willing to sacrifice everything for what he considered to be the benefit 
of the common man. He might almost repeat Robespierre's final bitter 
and puzzled phrase: "To die for the people and to be abhorred by 
them." So keen was the irritation aroused by Wilson's methods and 
personality that many a citizen stated frankly that he preferred to see 
Wilsonian policies which he approved meet defeat, rather than see them
carried to success by Wilson. This executive failing of the President 
was destined to jeopardize the greatest of his policies and to result in 
the personal tragedy of Wilson himself. 
Certain large political principles stand out in Wilson's writings and 
career as Governor and President. Of these the most striking, perhaps, 
is his conviction that the President of the United States must be 
something more than a mere executive superintendent. The entire 
responsibility for the administration of government, he believed, should 
rest upon the President, and in order to meet that responsibility, he must 
keep the reins of control in his own hands. In his first essays and in his 
later writings Wilson expressed his disgust with the system of 
congressional committees which threw enormous power into the hands 
of irresponsible professional politicians, and called for a President who 
would break that system and exercise greater directive authority. For a 
time he seemed, under the influence of Bagehot, to have believed in the 
feasibility of introducing something like the parliamentary system into 
the government of the United States. To the last he regarded the 
President as a sort of Prime Minister, at the head of his party in the 
Legislature and able to count absolutely upon its loyalty. More than this, 
he believed that the President should take a large share of responsibility 
for the legislative programme and ought to push this programme 
through by all means at his disposal. Such a creed appeared in his early 
writings and was largely carried into operation during his 
administration. We find him bringing all possible pressure upon the 
New Jersey Legislature in order to redeem his campaign pledges. When 
elected President, he went directly to Congress with his message, 
instead of sending it to be read. Time and again he intervened to 
forward his special legislative interests by direct influence. 
Both in his writings and in his actions Wilson has always advocated 
government by party. Theoretically and in practice he has been opposed 
to coalition government, for, in his belief, it divides responsibility. 
Although by no means an advocate of the old-type spoils system, 
rewards for party service seem to him essential. Curiously enough, 
while insisting that the President is the leader of his party like a Prime 
Minister, he has also described him, with an apparent lack of logic, as
the leader of the country. Because Wilson has thus confused party and 
people, it is easy to understand why he has at times claimed to 
represent the nation when, in reality, he was merely representing 
partisan views. Such an attitude is naturally irritating to the Opposition 
and explains something of the virulence that characterized the attacks 
made upon him in 1918 and    
    
		
	
	
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