Washington and His Colleagues | Page 7

the time the Constitution was
framed was that the consultative function would be exercised by the
Senate, which together with the President would form the
Administration. Upon this ground, Mason of Virginia refused to sign
the report of the constitutional convention. It was owing to practical
experience and not to the language of the Constitution that the
President was soon repelled from using the Senate as his privy council
and was thrown back upon the aid of the heads of the executive
departments, who were thus drawn close to him as his
Cabinet.[Footnote: In this formative process the Postmaster-General
was left outside in Washington's time, since his functions were purely
of a business nature, not directly affected by the issues on which

Washington desired advice. The Postmaster-General did not become a
member of the Cabinet until 1829.]
The inchoate character of the Cabinet for a considerable period
explains what might otherwise seem to be an anomaly,--the delay of
Jefferson in occupying his post. He did not arrive until March 21, 1790,
when Washington had been in office nearly a year. But this situation
occasioned no remark. The notion that the heads of the departments
formed a cabinet, taking office with the President and reflecting his
personal choice as his advisers, was not developed until long after
Washington's administration, although the Cabinet itself, as a distinct
feature of the system of government, dates from his first term. The
importance which the Cabinet soon acquired is evidence that, even
under a written constitution, institutions owe more to circumstances
than to intentions. The Constitution of the United States is no exception
to the rule that the true constitution of a country is the actual
distribution of power, written provisions being efficacious only in the
way and to the extent that they affect such distribution in practice.
Hence results may differ widely from the expectations with which
those provisions are introduced. A constitution is essentially a growth
and never merely a contrivance.
CHAPTER II
GREAT DECISIONS
While Washington was bearing with military fortitude the rigors and
annoyances of the imitation court in which he was confined, Congress
reached decisions that had a vast effect in determining the actual
character of the government. The first business in order of course was
the raising of revenue, for the treasury was empty, and payments of
interest due on the French and Spanish loans were years behind.
Madison attacked this problem before Washington arrived in New York
to take the oath of office. On April 8 he introduced in the House a
resolution which aimed only at giving immediate effect to a scheme of
duties and imposts that had been approved generally by the States in
1783. On the very next day debate upon this resolution began in the

committee of the whole, for there was then no system of standing
committees to intervene between the House and its business. The
debate soon broadened out far beyond the lines of the original scheme,
and in it the student finds lucidly presented the issues of public policy
that have accompanied tariff debates ever since.
Madison laid down the general principle that "commerce ought to be
free, and labor and industry left at large to find its proper object," but
suggested that it would be unwise to apply this principle without regard
to particular circumstances. "Although interest will, in general, operate
effectually to produce political good, yet there are causes in which
certain factitious circumstances may divert it from its natural channel,
or throw or retain it in an artificial one." In language which now reads
like prophecy he referred to cases "where cities, companies, or opulent
individuals engross the business from others, by having had an
uninterrupted possession of it, or by the extent of their capitals being
able to destroy a competition." The same situation could occur between
nations, and had to be considered. There was some truth, he also
thought, in the opinion "that each nation should have within itself the
means of defense, independent of foreign supplies," but he considered
that this argument had been urged beyond reason, as "there is good
reason to believe that, when it becomes necessary, we may obtain
supplies abroad as readily as any other nation whatsoever." He
instanced as a cogent reason in favor of protective duties that, as the
States had formerly the power of making regulations of trade to cherish
their domestic interests, it must be presumed that, when they put the
exercise of this power into other hands by adopting the Constitution,
"they must have done this with the expectation that those interests
would not be neglected" by Congress.
Actuated by such views, and doubtless also influenced by the great
need for revenue, Madison was on the whole favorable to amendments
extending the list of dutiable articles. Though there