The Problems of Philosophy

The Problems of Philosophy

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Title: The Problems of Philosophy
Author: Bertrand Russell
Release Date: June, 2004 [EBook #5827] [Yes, we are more than one year ahead of
schedule] [This file was first posted on September 10, 2002]
Edition: 10
Language: English
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The Problems of Philosophy Bertrand Russell

PREFACE
In the following pages I have confined myself in the main to those problems of
philosophy in regard to which I thought it possible to say something positive and
constructive, since merely negative criticism seemed out of place. For this reason, theory
of knowledge occupies a larger space than metaphysics in the present volume, and some
topics much discussed by philosophers are treated very briefly, if at all.
I have derived valuable assistance from unpublished writings of G. E. Moore and J. M.
Keynes: from the former, as regards the relations of sense-data to physical objects, and
from the latter as regards probability and induction. I have also profited greatly by the
criticisms and suggestions of Professor Gilbert Murray.
1912


CHAPTER I
APPEARANCE AND REALITY
Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could
doubt it? This question, which at first sight might not seem difficult, is really one of the
most difficult that can be asked. When we have realized the obstacles in the way of a
straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on the study of
philosophy--for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions, not
carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences, but
critically, after exploring all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all
the vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas.
In daily life, we assume as certain many things which, on a closer scrutiny, are found to
be so full of apparent contradictions that only a great amount of thought enables us to
know what it is that we really may believe. In the search for certainty, it is natural to
begin with our present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be
derived from them. But any statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences
make us know is very likely to be wrong. It seems to me that I am now sitting in a chair,
at a table of a certain shape, on which I see sheets of paper with writing or print. By
turning my head I see out of the window buildings and clouds and the sun. I believe that
the sun is about ninety-three million miles from the earth; that it is a hot globe many
times bigger than the earth; that, owing to the earth's rotation, it rises every morning, and
will continue to do so for an indefinite time in the future. I believe that, if any other
normal person comes into my room, he will see the same chairs and tables and books and
papers as I see, and that the table which I see is the same as the table which I feel
pressing against my arm. All this seems to be so evident as to be hardly worth stating,
except in answer to a man who doubts whether I know anything. Yet all this may be
reasonably doubted, and all of it requires much careful discussion before we can be sure
that we have stated it in a form that is wholly true.
To make our difficulties plain, let us concentrate attention on the table. To the eye it is
oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch it is smooth and cool and hard; when I tap it, it
gives