almost two o'clock in 
the morning that he rose, said to himself, "I've got it!" and then went 
contentedly to bed. And during the anxious months that followed the 
Lusitania, the Arabic, and those other outrages which have now taken 
their place in history, he spent night after night turning the matter over 
in his mind. But he found no way out of the humiliations presented by 
the policy of Washington. 
"Here we are swung loose in time," he wrote to his son Arthur, a few 
days after the first Lusitania note had been sent to Germany, "nobody 
knows the day or the week or the month or the year--and we are caught 
on this island, with no chance of escape, while the vast slaughter goes 
on and seems just beginning, and the degradation of war goes on week 
by week; and we live in hope that the United States will come in, as the 
only chance to give us standing and influence when the reorganization 
of the world must begin. (Beware of betraying the word 'hope'!) It has 
all passed far beyond anybody's power to describe. I simply go on day 
by day into unknown experiences and emotions, seeing nothing before 
me very clearly and remembering only dimly what lies behind. I can 
see only one proper thing: that all the world should fall to and hunt this 
wild beast down. 
"Two photographs of little Mollie[1] on my mantelpiece recall persons
and scenes and hopes unconnected with the war: few other things can. 
Bless the baby, she couldn't guess what a sweet purpose she serves." 
* * * * * 
The sensations of most Americans in London during this crisis are 
almost indescribable. Washington's failure promptly to meet the 
situation affected them with astonishment and humiliation. Colonel 
House was confident that war was impending, and for this reason he 
hurried his preparations to leave England; he wished to be in the United 
States, at the President's side, when the declaration was made. With this 
feeling about Mr. Wilson, Colonel House received a fearful shock a day 
or two after the Lusitania had gone down: while walking in Piccadilly, 
he caught a glimpse of one of the famous sandwich men, bearing a 
poster of an afternoon newspaper. This glaring broadside bore the 
following legend: "We are too proud to fight--Woodrow Wilson." The 
sight of that placard was Colonel House's first intimation that the 
President might not act vigorously. He made no attempt to conceal 
from Page and other important men at the American Embassy the 
shock which it had given him. Soon the whole of England was ringing 
with these six words; the newspapers were filled with stinging 
editorials and cartoons, and the music halls found in the Wilsonian 
phrase materials for their choicest jibes. Even in more serious quarters 
America was the subject of the most severe denunciation. No one felt 
these strictures more poignantly than President Wilson's closest 
confidant. A day or two before sailing home he came into the Embassy 
greatly depressed at the prevailing revulsion against the United States. 
"I feel," Colonel House said to Page, "as though I had been given a kick 
at every lamp post coming down Constitution Hill." A day or two 
afterward Colonel House sailed for America. 
II 
And now came the period of distress and of disillusionment. Three 
Lusitania notes were sent and were evasively answered, and 
Washington still seemed to be marking time. The one event in this 
exciting period which gave Page satisfaction was Mr. Bryan's 
resignation as Secretary of State. For Mr. Bryan personally Page had a
certain fondness, but as head of the State Department the Nebraska 
orator had been a cause of endless vexation. Many of Page's letters, 
already printed, bear evidence of the utter demoralization which existed 
in this branch of the Administration and this demoralization became 
especially glaring during the Lusitania crisis. No attempt was made 
even at this momentous period to keep the London Embassy informed 
as to what was taking place in Washington; Page's letters and 
cablegrams were, for the most part, unacknowledged and unanswered, 
and the American Ambassador was frequently obliged to obtain his 
information about the state of feeling in Washington from Sir Edward 
Grey. It must be said, in justice to Mr. Bryan, that this carelessness was 
nothing particularly new, for it had worried many ambassadors before 
Page. Readers of Charles Francis Adams's correspondence meet with 
the same complaints during the Civil War; even at the time of the Trent 
crisis, when for a fortnight Great Britain and the United States were 
living on the brink of war, Adams was kept entirely in the dark about 
the plans of Washington[2]. The letters of John Hay show a similar 
condition during his brief ambassadorship to Great Britain in 
1897-1898[3]. 
But Mr.    
    
		
	
	
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