was of old said to 
have done at Cannae, amid the fierce shock of mortal foes in that
narrow field. 
The respect for authority which had so long been the distinguishing 
characteristic of the Netherlanders seemed to have disappeared. It was 
difficult--now that the time-honoured laws and privileges in defence of 
which, and of liberty of worship included in them, the Provinces had 
made war forty years long had been trampled upon by military 
force--for those not warmed by the fire of Gomarus to feel their ancient 
respect for the magistracy. The magistracy at that moment seemed to 
mean the sword. 
The Spanish government was inevitably encouraged by the spectacle 
thus presented. We have seen the strong hopes entertained by the 
council at Madrid, two years before the crisis now existing had 
occurred. We have witnessed the eagerness with which the King 
indulged the dream of recovering the sovereignty which his father had 
lost, and the vast schemes which he nourished towards that purpose, 
founded on the internal divisions which were reducing the Republic to 
impotence. Subsequent events had naturally made him more sanguine 
than ever. There was now a web of intrigue stretching through the 
Provinces to bring them all back under the sceptre of Spain. The 
imprisonment of the great stipendiary, the great conspirator, the man 
who had sold himself and was on the point of selling his country, had 
not terminated those plots. Where was the supposed centre of that 
intrigue? In the council of state of the Netherlands, ever fiercely 
opposed to Barneveld and stuffed full of his mortal enemies. Whose 
name was most familiar on the lips of the Spanish partisans engaged in 
these secret schemes? That of Adrian Manmaker, President of the 
Council, representative of Prince Maurice as first noble of Zealand in 
the States-General, chairman of the committee sent by that body to 
Utrecht to frustrate the designs of the Advocate, and one of the 
twenty-four commissioners soon to be appointed to sit in judgment 
upon him. 
The tale seems too monstrous for belief, nor is it to be admitted with 
certainty, that Manmaker and the other councillors implicated had 
actually given their adhesion to the plot, because the Spanish 
emissaries in their correspondence with the King assured him of the 
fact. But if such a foundation for suspicion could have been found 
against Barneveld and his friends, the world would not have heard the
last of it from that hour to this. 
It is superfluous to say that the Prince was entirely foreign to these 
plans. He had never been mentioned as privy to the little arrangements 
of Councillor du Agean and others, although he was to benefit by them. 
In the Spanish schemes he seems to have been considered as an 
impediment, although indirectly they might tend to advance him. 
"We have managed now, I hope, that his Majesty will be recognized as 
sovereign of the country," wrote the confidential agent of the King of 
Spain in the Netherlands, Emmanuel Sueyro, to the government of 
Madrid. "The English will oppose it with all their strength. But they can 
do nothing except by making Count Maurice sovereign of Holland and 
duke of Julich and Cleve. Maurice will also contrive to make himself 
master of Wesel, so it is necessary for the Archduke to be beforehand 
with him and make sure of the place. It is also needful that his Majesty 
should induce the French government to talk with the Netherlanders 
and convince them that it is time to prolong the Truce." 
This was soon afterwards accomplished. The French minister at 
Brussels informed Archduke Albert that du Maurier had been instructed 
to propose the prolongation, and that he had been conferring with the 
Prince of Orange and the States-General on the subject. At first the 
Prince had expressed disinclination, but at the last interview both he 
and the States had shown a desire for it, and the French King had 
requested from the Archduke a declaration whether the Spanish 
government would be willing to treat for it. In such case Lewis would 
offer himself as mediator and do his best to bring about a successful 
result. 
But it was not the intention of the conspirators in the Netherlands that 
the Truce should be prolonged. On the contrary the negotiation for it 
was merely to furnish the occasion for fully developing their plot. "The 
States and especially those of Zealand will reply that they no longer 
wish the Truce," continued Sueyro, "and that they would prefer war to 
such a truce. They desire to put ships on the coast of Flanders, to which 
the Hollanders are opposed because it would be disagreeable to the 
French. So the Zealanders will be the first to say that the Netherlanders 
must come back to his Majesty. This their President    
    
		
	
	
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