The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer | Page 2

body is so weak and
perishable as man's. How shall a man be proud, when his conception is
a crime, his birth a penalty, his life a labour, and death a necessity!--
_Quid superbit homo? cujus conceptio culpa, Nasci poena, labor vita,
necesse mori_!
Therefore, in opposition to the above-mentioned form of the Kantian
principle, I should be inclined to lay down the following rule: When
you come into contact with a man, no matter whom, do not attempt an

objective appreciation of him according to his worth and dignity. Do
not consider his bad will, or his narrow understanding and perverse
ideas; as the former may easily lead you to hate and the latter to despise
him; but fix your attention only upon his sufferings, his needs, his
anxieties, his pains. Then you will always feel your kinship with him;
you will sympathise with him; and instead of hatred or contempt you
will experience the commiseration that alone is the peace to which the
Gospel calls us. The way to keep down hatred and contempt is certainly
not to look for a man's alleged "dignity," but, on the contrary, to regard
him as an object of pity.
The Buddhists, as the result of the more profound views which they
entertain on ethical and metaphysical subjects, start from the cardinal
vices and not the cardinal virtues; since the virtues make their
appearance only as the contraries or negations of the vices. According
to Schmidt's History of the Eastern Mongolians the cardinal vices in
the Buddhist scheme are four: Lust, Indolence, Anger, and Avarice. But
probably instead of Indolence, we should read Pride; for so it stands in
the _Lettres édifiantes et curieuses_,[1] where Envy, or Hatred, is
added as a fifth. I am confirmed in correcting the statement of the
excellent Schmidt by the fact that my rendering agrees with the
doctrine of the Sufis, who are certainly under the influence of the
Brahmins and Buddhists. The Sufis also maintain that there are four
cardinal vices, and they arrange them in very striking pairs, so that Lust
appears in connection with Avarice, and Anger with Pride. The four
cardinal virtues opposed to them would be Chastity and Generosity,
together with Gentleness and Humility.
[Footnote 1: Edit, of 1819, vol. vi., p. 372.]
When we compare these profound ideas of morality, as they are
entertained by oriental nations, with the celebrated cardinal virtues of
Plato, which have been recapitulated again and again--Justice, Valour,
Temperance, and Wisdom--it is plain that the latter are not based on
any clear, leading idea, but are chosen on grounds that are superficial
and, in part, obviously false. Virtues must be qualities of the will, but
Wisdom is chiefly an attribute of the Intellect. [Greek: Sophrosynae],
which Cicero translates _Temperantia_, is a very indefinite and
ambiguous word, and it admits, therefore, of a variety of applications: it
may mean discretion, or abstinence, or keeping a level head. Courage is

not a virtue at all; although sometimes it is a servant or instrument of
virtue; but it is just as ready to become the servant of the greatest
villainy. It is really a quality of temperament. Even Geulinx (in the
preface to this _Ethics_) condemned the Platonic virtues and put the
following in their place: Diligence, Obedience, Justice and Humility;
which are obviously bad. The Chinese distinguish five cardinal virtues:
Sympathy, Justice, Propriety, Wisdom, and Sincerity. The virtues of
Christianity are theological, not cardinal: Faith, Love, and Hope.
Fundamental disposition towards others, assuming the character either
of Envy or of Sympathy, is the point at which the moral virtues and
vices of mankind first diverge. These two diametrically opposite
qualities exist in every man; for they spring from the inevitable
comparison which he draws between his own lot and that of others.
According as the result of this comparison affects his individual
character does the one or the other of these qualities become the source
and principle of all his action. Envy builds the wall between Thee and
Me thicker and stronger; Sympathy makes it slight and transparent; nay,
sometimes it pulls down the wall altogether; and then the distinction
between self and not-self vanishes.
Valour, which has been mentioned as a virtue, or rather the Courage on
which it is based (for valour is only courage in war), deserves a closer
examination. The ancients reckoned Courage among the virtues, and
cowardice among the vices; but there is no corresponding idea in the
Christian scheme, which makes for charity and patience, and in its
teaching forbids all enmity or even resistance. The result is that with
the moderns Courage is no longer a virtue. Nevertheless it must be
admitted that cowardice does not seem to be very compatible with any
nobility of character--if only for the reason that it betrays