large French army defeated us to the profit and 
advantage of England. That England, and England alone, is again 
behind this attack upon us by Japan has been dwelt upon by those who 
have already addressed you. Our enemies do not see themselves called 
upon to depart in the slightest degree from a policy that has so long 
stood them in such good stead, and it must, therefore, be our policy to 
assure ourselves of the alliance, or at least, where an alliance is 
unattainable, of the benevolent neutrality of the other continental 
Powers in view of a war with England. To begin with, as regards our 
ally, the French Republic, a satisfactory solution of our task in this 
direction is already assured by the existing treaties. Yet these treaties 
do not bind the French Government to afford us military support in the
case of a war which, in the eyes of shortsighted observers, might 
perhaps be regarded as one which we had ourselves provoked. We have 
accordingly opened negotiations through our Ambassador with M. 
Delcasse, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and with the 
President of the Republic himself. I have the supreme satisfaction of 
being in a position to lay before you the result of these negotiations in 
the form of a despatch just received from our Ambassador in Paris. It 
runs, in the main, as follows: 'I hasten to inform Your Excellency that, 
in the name of the French Republic, M. Delcasse has given me the 
solemn assurance that France will declare war upon England at the 
moment His Majesty the Tsar has directed his armies to march upon 
India. The considerations which have prompted the French Government 
to take this step have been further explained to me by M. Delcasse in 
our conference of this day, when he expressed himself somewhat as 
follows: "Napoleon, a hundred years ago, perceived with rare 
discernment that England was the real enemy of all continental nations, 
and that the European continent could not pursue any other policy but 
to combine in resisting that great pirate. The magnificent plan of 
Napoleon was the alliance of France with Spain, Italy, Austria, 
Germany, and Russia, in order to combat the rapacity of England. And 
he would, in all probability, have carried his scheme through had it not 
been that considerations of domestic policy determined the Tsar 
Alexander I., in spite of his admiration for Napoleon's ability, to run 
counter to the latter's intentions. The consequences of Napoleon's 
defeat have shown themselves sufficiently clearly during the past 
hundred years in the enormous growth of the English power. The 
present political constellation, which in many respects is very similar to 
that of the year 1804, should be utilised to revive Napoleon's plan once 
more. Russia has, of course, the first and most vital interest in the 
downfall of England, for, so long as Great Britain controls all the seas 
and all the important coastlines, it is like a giant whose hands and feet 
are fettered. Yet France is also checked in her natural development. Her 
flourishing colonies in America and the Atlantic Ocean were wrested 
from her in the eighteenth century. She was ousted by this 
overpowering adversary from her settlements in the East Indies and-- 
what the French nation feels perhaps most acutely--Egypt, purchased 
for France by the great Napoleon with the blood of his soldiers, was
weaned away by English gold and English intrigues. The Suez Canal, 
built by a Frenchman, Lesseps, is in the possession of the English, 
facilitating their communications with India, and securing them the 
sovereignty of the world. France will accordingly make certain 
stipulations as the price of its alliance-- stipulations which are so loyal 
and equitable that there is no question whatever of their not being 
agreed to on the part of her ally, Russia. France demands that her 
possessions in Tonking, Cochin China, Cambodia, Annam, and Laos 
shall be guaranteed; that Russia be instrumental in assisting her to 
acquire Egypt, and that it pledge itself to support the French policy in 
Tunis and the rest of Africa." In accordance with my instructions, I felt 
myself empowered to assure M. Delcasse that his conditions were 
accepted on our side. In answer to my question, whether a war with 
England would be popular in France, the Minister said: "The French 
people will be ready for any sacrifice if we make Fashoda our war-cry. 
British insolence never showed itself more brutal and insulting than 
over this affair. Our brave Marchand was on the spot with a superior 
force, and France was within her rights. The simple demand of an 
English officer, who possessed no other force but the moral one of the 
English flag, compelled us, however, under the political circumstances 
which then obtained, to abandon our righteous claims, and to recall    
    
		
	
	
	Continue reading on your phone by scaning this QR Code
 
	 	
	
	
	    Tip: The current page has been bookmarked automatically. If you wish to continue reading later, just open the 
Dertz Homepage, and click on the 'continue reading' link at the bottom of the page.
	    
	    
