can be taken. Thus a committee can prevent 
the passage of a bill by deliberately neglecting to report it back to the 
main body. 
When a measure passes either Senate or Assembly, it goes to the other 
House, and is once again referred to a committee. Again does the fate 
of the bill hang on committee action. Thus, every measure before it can 
pass the Legislature must, in the ordinary course of legislation, pass the 
scrutiny of two legislative committees, either one of which may delay 
its passage or even deny Senate or Assembly, or both, opportunity to 
act upon it. 
To be sure, one of the rules of the Assembly of 1909 required that all 
bills referred to committees should be reported back within ten days, 
while the Senate rules provided that committees must act on bills 
referred to them as soon as "practicable," with the further provision that 
a majority vote of the Senate could compel a report on a bill at any time. 
But these rules were employed to little advantage. In the Assembly, for 
example, the Commonwealth Club bills, referred to the Judiciary 
Committee on January 15, were not acted upon by the committee at all. 
These bills, in spite of the ten days' rule, remained in the committee 
sixty-seven days. The Direct primary bill was held up in the Senate 
Committee on Election Laws from January 8 until February 16, and at 
that late day came out of the committee with practically unfavorable
recommendation. It was noticeable that few, if any, important reform 
measures were given favorable recommendation by a Senate committee. 
Thus the Anti-Racetrack Gambling bill, the Direct Primary bill, the 
Local Option bill, received the stamp of Senate committee disapproval. 
They were returned to the Senate with the recommendation that they do 
not pass. The same is largely true of the action of the Assembly 
Committees.[4] 
If machine-controlled committees could delay action on reform 
measures, they could at the same time expedite the passage of bills 
which the machine element favored, or which had been amended to the 
machine's liking. Thus the Change of Venue bill, which reached the 
Senate on March 15, was returned from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee the day following, March 16, with the recommendation that 
it "do pass." The Wheelan bills reached the Senate on March 17, and 
were at once referred to the Judiciary Committee. The Judiciary 
Committee that very day reported them back with favorable 
recommendation. Had they been delayed in the committee even 48 
hours, their final passage would have been improbable. 
Curiously enough, the Judiciary Committee was the one Senate 
committee whose members President Porter did not name. Following a 
time-honored custom, every attorney at law in the Senate was made a 
member of the committee. It so happened that ten of the nineteen 
lawyers in the Senate were on the side of reform as against machine 
policies, eight generally voted with the machine, while the nineteenth 
gave evidence of being in a state of chronic doubt. This gave the reform 
element a majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee. But President 
Porter had the naming of the chairman of the committee, and the order 
of the rank of its members. The Lieutenant-Governor's fine 
discrimination is shown by the fact that the Chairman of the Committee 
and the four ranking members were counted on the side of the machine. 
The Assembly committees acted quite as expeditiously on measures 
which had passed the Senate in a form satisfactory to machine interests. 
Thus, the Wright Railroad Regulation bill, which reached the Assembly 
on March 12, was reported back to the Assembly by the Assembly 
Committee on Common Carriers the day following, March 13. 
It will be seen that the reform majority unquestionably weakened its 
position by permitting the machine minority to organize the Legislature.
This phase of the problem which confronts the State will be dealt with 
in the concluding chapter. 
[1] One of the best witnesses to the viciousness of this measure is 
Governor Gillett, surely an unprejudiced observer. In giving his reasons 
for vetoing the bill, Governor Gillett said: 
"I have several reasons for saying that I will veto the bill. One reason is 
that I have always been opposed to it. When I was in the Senate in 1897 
I was against it and again in 1899 I fought it in the Judiciary Committee. 
Two years ago I ignored another such measure that had passed through 
the Legislature, so that I would not be living up to my policy of the past 
if I should sign this bill." 
"But even if I had never had the opportunity to record my opposition on 
these different occasions, I should have vetoed the bill anyway, because 
it is a vicious bill. The bill is not a change of venue bill    
    
		
	
	
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