Sea-Power and Other Studies | Page 6

from the same fate; its own waters were likewise
commanded by foreign fleets.' The Romans were for a long time too
much occupied at home to take much interest in Mediterranean matters.
The position of the Carthaginians in the western basin of the

Mediterranean was very like that of the Portuguese long afterwards in
India. The latter kept within reach of the sea; 'nor did their rule ever
extend a day's march from their ships.'[18] 'The Carthaginians in
Spain,' says Mommsen, 'made no effort to acquire the interior from the
warlike native nations; they were content with the possession of the
mines and of stations for traffic and for shell and other fisheries.'
Allowance being made for the numbers of the classes engaged in
administration, commerce, and supervision, it is nearly certain that
Carthage could not furnish the crews required by both a great war-navy
and a great mercantile marine. No one is surprised on finding that the
land-forces of Carthage were composed largely of alien mercenaries.
We have several examples from which we can infer a parallel, if not an
identical, condition of her maritime resources. How, then, was the great
Carthaginian carrying-trade provided for? The experience of more than
one country will enable us to answer this question. The ocean trade of
those off-shoots or dependencies of the United Kingdom, viz. the
United States, Australasia, and India, is largely or chiefly conducted by
shipping of the old country. So that of Carthage was largely conducted
by old Phoenicians. These may have obtained a 'Carthaginian Register,'
or the contemporary equivalent; but they could not all have been purely
Carthaginian or Liby-Phoenician. This must have been the case even
more with the war-navy. British India for a considerable time possessed
a real and indeed highly efficient navy; but it was officered entirely and
manned almost entirely by men from the 'old country.' Moreover, it was
small. The wealth of India would have sufficed to furnish a larger
material element; but, as the country could not supply the personnel, it
would have been absurd to speak of the sea-power of India apart from
that of England. As soon as the Romans chose to make the most of
their natural resources the maritime predominance of Carthage was
doomed. The artificial basis of the latter's sea-power would not enable
it to hold out against serious and persistent assaults. Unless this is
perceived it is impossible to understand the story of the Punic wars.
Judged by every visible sign of strength, Carthage, the richer, the more
enterprising, ethnically the more predominant amongst her neighbours,
and apparently the more nautical, seemed sure to win in the great
struggle with Rome which, by the conditions of the case, was to be
waged largely on the water. Yet those who had watched the struggles of

the Punic city with the Sicilian Greeks, and especially that with
Agathocles, must have seen reason to cherish doubts concerning her
naval strength. It was an anticipation of the case of Spain in the age of
Philip II. As the great Elizabethan seamen discerned the defects of the
Spanish naval establishment, so men at Rome discerned those of the
Carthaginian. Dates in connection with this are of great significance. A
comprehensive measure, with the object of 'rescuing their marine from
its condition of impotence,' was taken by the Romans in the year 267
B.C. Four quoestores _classici_--in modern naval English we may
perhaps call them port-admirals--were nominated, and one was
stationed at each of four ports. The objects of the Roman Senate, so
Mommsen tells us, were very obvious. They were 'to recover their
independence by sea, to cut off the maritime communications of
Tarentum, to close the Adriatic against fleets coming from Epirus, and
to emancipate themselves from Carthaginian supremacy.' Four years
afterwards the first Punic war began. It was, and had to be, largely a
naval contest. The Romans waged it with varying fortune, but in the
end triumphed by means of their sea-power. 'The sea was the place
where all great destinies were decided.'[19] The victory of Catulus over
the Carthaginian fleet off the Ægatian Islands decided the war and left
to the Romans the possession of Sicily and the power of possessing
themselves of Sardinia and Corsica. It would be an interesting and
perhaps not a barren investigation to inquire to what extent the decline
of the mother states of Phoenicia, consequent on the campaigns of
Alexander the Great, had helped to enfeeble the naval efficiency of the
Carthaginian defences. One thing was certain. Carthage had now met
with a rival endowed with natural maritime resources greater than her
own. That rival also contained citizens who understood the true
importance of sea-power. 'With a statesmanlike sagacity from which
succeeding generations might have drawn a lesson, the leading men of
the