Sea-Power and Other Studies | Page 4

the acquisition of a coast-line and the
absorption of a maritime population. We shall find that the process
loses none of its importance in recent years. 'The ancient empires,' says
the historian of Greece, Ernst Curtius, 'as long as no foreign elements
had intruded into them, had an invincible horror of the water.' When the
condition, which Curtius notices in parenthesis, arose, the 'horror'
disappeared. There is something highly significant in the uniformity of
the efforts of Assyria, Egypt, Babylon, and Persia to get possession of
the maritime resources of Phoenicia. Our own immediate posterity will,
perhaps, have to reckon with the results of similar efforts in our own
day. It is this which gives a living interest to even the very ancient
history of sea-power, and makes the study of it of great practical
importance to us now. We shall see, as we go on, how the phenomena
connected with it reappear with striking regularity in successive periods.
Looked at in this light, the great conflicts of former ages are full of
useful, indeed necessary, instruction.
[Footnote 14: Mommsen, _Hist.Rome, English trans., i. p. 153.]
In the first and greatest of the contests waged by the nations of the East
against Europe--the Persian wars--sea-power was the governing factor.
Until Persia had expanded to the shores of the Levant the European
Greeks had little to fear from the ambition of the great king. The
conquest of Egypt by Cambyses had shown how formidable that
ambition could be when supported by an efficient navy. With the aid of
the naval forces of the Phoenician cities the Persian invasion of Greece
was rendered comparatively easy. It was the naval contingents from
Phoenicia which crushed the Ionian revolt. The expedition of
Mardonius, and still more that of Datis and Artaphernes, had indicated
the danger threatening Greece when the master of a great army was
likewise the master of a great navy. Their defeat at Marathon was not
likely to, and as a matter of fact did not, discourage the Persians from
further attempts at aggression. As the advance of Cambyses into Egypt
had been flanked by a fleet, so also was that of Xerxes into Greece. By
the good fortune sometimes vouch-safed to a people which, owing to
its obstinate opposition to, or neglect of, a wise policy, scarcely
deserves it, there appeared at Athens an influential citizen who

understood all that was meant by the term sea-power. Themistocles saw
more clearly than any of his contemporaries that, to enable Athens to
play a leading part in the Hellenic world, she needed above all things a
strong navy. 'He had already in his eye the battle-field of the future.' He
felt sure that the Persians would come back, and come with such forces
that resistance in the open field would be out of the question. One scene
of action remained--the sea. Persuaded by him the Athenians increased
their navy, so that of the 271 vessels comprising the Greek fleet at
Artemisium, 147 had been provided by Athens, which also sent a large
reinforcement after the first action. Though no one has ever surpassed
Themistocles in the faculty of correctly estimating the importance of
sea-power, it was understood by Xerxes as clearly as by him that the
issue of the war depended upon naval operations. The arrangements
made under the Persian monarch's direction, and his very personal
movements, show that this was his view. He felt, and probably
expressed the feeling, exactly as--in the war of Arnerican
Independence--Washington did in the words, 'whatever efforts are
made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in the
present contest.' The decisive event was the naval action of Salamis. To
have made certain of success, the Persians should have first obtained a
command of the Ægean, as complete for all practical purposes as the
French and English had of the sea generally in the war against Russia
of 1854-56. The Persian sea-power was not equal to the task. The fleet
of the great king was numerically stronger than that of the Greek allies;
but it has been proved many times that naval efficiency does not
depend on numerical superiority alone. The choice sections of the
Persian fleet were the contingents of the Ionians and Phoenicians. The
former were half-hearted or disaffected; whilst the latter were, at best,
not superior in skill, experience, and valour to the Greek sailors. At
Salamis Greece was saved not only from the ambition and vengeance
of Xerxes, but also and for many centuries from oppression by an
Oriental conqueror. Persia did not succeed against the Greeks, not
because she had no sea-power, but because her sea-power, artificially
built up, was inferior to that which was a natural element of the vitality
of her foes. Ionia was lost and Greece