Recent Tendencies in Ethics | Page 5

important, that the two systems did not mean the same thing, that we
could not rely upon altruistic conduct always being for individual
benefit, that there was no 'natural identity' between egoism and altruism.
He held that morality, to save it from an unsolved dualism, required a
principle capable of reconciling the discrepancy between the conduct in
accordance with the axiom of Benevolence and the conduct in
accordance with the equally rational axiom of Self-love.[1]
[Footnote 1: Professor Sidgwick's last words on the question are as
follows: "If then the reconciliation of duty and self-interest is to be
regarded as a hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamental
contradiction in one chief department of our thought, it remains to ask
how far this necessity constitutes a sufficient reason for accepting this
hypothesis.... Those who hold that the edifice of physical science is
really constructed of conclusions logically inferred from self-evident
premises, may reasonably demand that any practical judgments
claiming philosophic certainty should be based on an equally firm
foundation. If, on the other hand, we find that in our supposed
knowledge of the world of nature propositions are commonly taken to

be universally true, which yet seem to rest on no other grounds than
that we have a strong disposition to accept them, and that they are
indispensable to the systematic coherence of our beliefs,--it will be
more difficult to reject a similarly supported assumption in ethics,
without opening the door to universal scepticism" ('Methods of Ethics,'
6th ed., pp. 506, 507).]
But while this question of egoism and altruism has thus been
recognised as a possible source of perplexity, affecting the ethical
standard itself, both egoists and orthodox utilitarians have commonly
agreed--though for different reasons--to insist that morality means the
same for them both, and to hold with Epicurus that "we cannot lead a
life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honour, and
justice." It is only in quite recent days that a thoroughgoing attempt has
been made to revalue all the old standards of morality. And the attempt
is made from a point of view which is certainly not altruistic. The
Utilitarian writers of last generation, if they admitted the conflict of
egoism and altruism, weighted every consideration on the side of
altruism. They emphasised therefore the agreement between their own
utilitarian doctrine and the Christian morality in which altruism is
fundamental. On the other hand, the more recent tendency to which I
refer emphasises and exalts the egoistic side, and thus accentuates the
difference between the new moral code--if we may call it moral--and
the Christian morality.
The boldest and most brilliant exponent of this tendency is Friedrich
Nietzsche[1], already the object of a cult in Germany, and an author to
be reckoned with as one of the new forces in European thought. It is
true that some of the most characteristic products of his genius are
closely akin to the insanity which clouded his later years. Yet it is
impossible to read his writings without recognising his penetrating
insight as well as his abundance of virile passion. Besides, in spite of
all his extravagances--or, perhaps, because of them--he is symptomatic
of certain tendencies of the age. Nietzsche's demand is for nothing less
than a revision of the whole moral code and a reversal of its most
characteristic provisions. And he has the rare distinction of being a
writer on morality who disclaims the title of 'moralist.'
[Footnote 1: Friedrich Nietzsche, the son of a clergyman, was born in
Saxony in 1844. In 1869 he became Professor of Classical Philology in

Basel, and held this post for ten years, though his work was interrupted
by ill-health for a long period. His first book was published in 1871; the
preface to the last was dated "on the 30th of September 1888, the day
on which the first book of the Transvaluation of all Values was
completed." He became hopelessly insane in 1889, and died in 1900.
The reader will find a luminous estimate of his work in the essay on
"The Life and Opinions of Friedrich Nietzsche" in Pringle-Pattison's
'Man's Place in the Cosmos,' 2nd ed., 1902.]
The ideas which Nietzsche expresses go to the root of the matter. In the
first place, he drew a distinction between what he regarded as two
different types of morality. One of these he called the morality of
masters or nobles, and he called the other the morality of slaves.
Self-reliance and courage may be cited as the qualities typical of the
noble morality, for they are the qualities which tend to make the man
who possesses them a master over others, to give him a prominent and
powerful place in the world, and to help him to subjugate to his will
both nature and his fellow-men. On the