Proportional Representation | Page 2

of
expediency may turn in favour of its adoption. They suggest "that some
need may become felt which can only be satisfied by proportional
representation in some form or another," and I do not think I
misrepresent their attitude in believing that a very small change of
circumstances might suffice to precipitate a reversal of their present
conclusion. All who are familiar with the conduct of political
controversies must recognize the situation thus revealed. Again and
again have proposals of reform been made which the wise could not
recommend for acceptance "here and now." They are seen to be good
for other folk; they fit into the circumstances of other societies; they
may have worked well in climates different from our own; nay, among
ourselves they might be tried in some auxiliary fashion separated from
the great use for which they have been recommended, but we will wait
for the proper moment of their undisguised general acceptance. It is in
this way that political ideas have been propagated, and it would be a
mistake if we were hastily to condemn what are sure and trusty lines of
progress. When the Royal Commissioners, after all their hesitations
about the intrusion of proportional representation even in the thinnest
of wedges into the House of Commons, go on to say that "there would
be much to be said in its favour as a method for the constitution of an

elected Second Chamber," and again, though admitting that this was
beyond their reference, express a pretty transparent wish that it might
be tried in municipal elections, the friends of the principle may well be
content with the line which the tide of opinion has reached. The
concluding words of this branch of the Report are scarcely necessary
for their satisfaction: "We need only add, that should it be decided at
any time to introduce proportional representation here for political
elections the change would be facilitated if experience had been gained
in municipal elections alike by electors and officials."
A few words may be permitted in reference to the line of defence
advanced by the Commissioners against the inroad of proportional
representation. Mr. Humphreys has dealt with this with sufficient
fullness in Chapters X and XI which deal with objections to
proportional representation; and I refer the reader to what he has
written on the general subject. My own comment on the position of the
Commissioners must be short. Briefly stated, their position is that
proportional representation "cannot be recommended in a political
election where the question which party is to govern the country plays a
predominant part," and, as elsewhere they put it, "a general election is
in fact considered by a large portion of the electorate of this country as
practically a referendum on the question which of two governments
shall be returned to power." The first remark to be made upon this
wonderful barrier is that a general election avowedly cannot be trusted
as a true referendum. It produces a balance of members in favour of
one party, though even this may fail to be realized at no distant future,
but the balance of members may be and has been under our present
system in contradiction to the balance of the electors; or in other words,
a referendum would answer the vital question which party is to govern,
in the opposite sense to the answer given by a general election. This is
so frankly admitted in the Report that it is difficult to understand how
the Commissioners can recommend adherence to a process which they
have proved to be a delusion. Even on the bare question of ascertaining
what government the nation desires to see installed at Westminster, the
present method is found wanting, whilst the reformed plan, by giving
us a reproduction in miniature of the divisions of national opinion,
would in the balance of judgment of the microcosm give us the balance

of judgment in the nation. If a referendum is really wanted, a general
election with single-member constituencies does not give us a secure
result, and an election under proportional representation would ensure
it. A different question obviously disturbs many minds, to wit, the
stability of a government resting on the support of a truly representative
assembly. Here again it may be asked whether our present machinery
really satisfies conditions of stable equilibrium. We know they are
wanting, and with the development of groups among us, they will be
found still more wanting. The groups which emerge under existing
processes are uncertain in shape, in size, and in their combinations, and
governments resting upon them are infirm even when they appear to be
strong. It is only when the groups in the legislature represent in faithful
proportion bodies of convinced adherents returning them as their
representatives that such groups become strong