Peaceless Europe | Page 7

a peace footing
her army was the most numerous in the world, over one million three
hundred thousand men; when her officers began to fail Russia was
unable to replace them so rapidly as the proportion of nine or ten times
more than normal required by the War.
Russia has always had a latent force of development; there is within her
a vis inertiae equivalent to a mysterious energy of expansion. Her

birth-rate is higher than that of any other European country; she does
not progress, she increases. Her weight acts as a menace to
neighbouring countries, and as, by a mysterious historic law the
primitive migrations of peoples and the ancient invasions mostly
originated from the territories now occupied by Russia, the latter has
succeeded in amalgamating widely different peoples and in creating
unity where no affinity appeared possible.
At any rate, although suffering from an excessively centralized
government and a form of constitution which did not allow the
development of popular energies nor a sufficient education of the
people, Russia was perhaps, half a century before the War, the
European country which, considering the difficulties in her path, had
accomplished most progress.
European Russia, with her yearly excess of from one million and a half
to two million births over deaths, with the development of her
industries and the formation of important commercial centres,
progressed very rapidly and was about to become the pivot of European
politics.
When it will be possible to examine carefully the diplomatic documents
of the War, and time will allow us to judge them calmly, it will be seen
that Russia's attitude was the real and underlying cause of the
world-conflict. She alone promoted and kept alive the agitations in
Serbia and of the Slavs in Austria; she alone in Germany's eyes
represented the peril of the future. Germany has never believed in a
French danger. She knew very well that France, single handed, could
never have withstood Germany, numerically so much her superior.
Russia was the only danger that Germany saw, and the continual
increase of the Russian army was her gravest preoccupation. Before the
War, when Italy was Germany's ally, the leading German statesmen
with whom I had occasion to discuss the situation did nothing but
allude to the Russian peril. It was known (and subsequent facts have
amply proved it) that the Tsar was absolutely devoid of will power, that
he was led and carried away by conflicting currents, and that his
advisers were for the most part favourable to the War. After the

Japanese defeat the militarist party felt keenly the need for just such a
great military revival and a brilliant revanche in Europe.
Possessing an enormous wealth of raw materials and an immense
territory, Russia represented Europe's great resource, her support for
the future.
If the three great empires had attained enviable prosperity and
development in 1914, when the War burst, the three great western
democracies, Great Britain, France and Italy, had likewise progressed
immensely.
Great Britain, proud of her "splendid isolation," and ruler of the seas,
traded in every country of the world. Having the vastest empire, she
was also financially the greatest creditor country: creditor of America
and Asia, of the new African states and of Australia. Perhaps all this
wealth had somewhat diminished the spirit of enterprise before the War,
and popular culture also suffered from this unprecedented prosperity.
There was not the spasmodic effort noticeable in Germany, but a
continuous and secure expansion, an undisputed supremacy. Although
somewhat preoccupied at Germany's progress and regarding it as a peril
for the future, Great Britain attached more importance to the problems
of her Empire, namely to her internal constitution: like ancient Rome,
she was a truly imperial country in the security of her supremacy, in her
calm, in her forbearance.
France continued patiently to accumulate wealth. She did not increase
her population, but ably added to her territory and her savings.
Threatened with the phenomenon known to political economists under
the name of "oliganthropy," or lack of men, she had founded a colonial
empire which may be regarded as the largest on earth. It is true that the
British colonies, even before the War, covered an area of thirty million
square kilometres, while France's colonial empire was slightly over
twelve millions. But it must be remembered that the British colonies
are not colonies in the real sense of the word, but consist chiefly in
Dominions which enjoy an almost complete autonomy. Canada alone
represents about one-third of the territories of the British Dominions;
Australia and New Zealand more than one-fourth, and Australasia, the

South African Union and Canada put together represent more than
two-thirds of the Empire, while India accounts for about fifty per cent.
of the missing third. After England, France was the most important
creditor country.