Parmenides | Page 6

to follow from the assumption that being is many.' 'Such is
my meaning.' 'I see,' said Socrates, turning to Parmenides, 'that Zeno is
your second self in his writings too; you prove admirably that the all is
one: he gives proofs no less convincing that the many are nought. To
deceive the world by saying the same thing in entirely different forms,
is a strain of art beyond most of us.' 'Yes, Socrates,' said Zeno; 'but
though you are as keen as a Spartan hound, you do not quite catch the
motive of the piece, which was only intended to protect Parmenides
against ridicule by showing that the hypothesis of the existence of the
many involved greater absurdities than the hypothesis of the one. The
book was a youthful composition of mine, which was stolen from me,
and therefore I had no choice about the publication.' 'I quite believe
you,' said Socrates; 'but will you answer me a question? I should like to
know, whether you would assume an idea of likeness in the abstract,
which is the contradictory of unlikeness in the abstract, by participation
in either or both of which things are like or unlike or partly both. For
the same things may very well partake of like and unlike in the concrete,
though like and unlike in the abstract are irreconcilable. Nor does there
appear to me to be any absurdity in maintaining that the same things
may partake of the one and many, though I should be indeed surprised
to hear that the absolute one is also many. For example, I, being many,
that is to say, having many parts or members, am yet also one, and
partake of the one, being one of seven who are here present (compare
Philebus). This is not an absurdity, but a truism. But I should be
amazed if there were a similar entanglement in the nature of the ideas
themselves, nor can I believe that one and many, like and unlike, rest

and motion, in the abstract, are capable either of admixture or of
separation.'
Pythodorus said that in his opinion Parmenides and Zeno were not very
well pleased at the questions which were raised; nevertheless, they
looked at one another and smiled in seeming delight and admiration of
Socrates. 'Tell me,' said Parmenides, 'do you think that the abstract
ideas of likeness, unity, and the rest, exist apart from individuals which
partake of them? and is this your own distinction?' 'I think that there are
such ideas.' 'And would you make abstract ideas of the just, the
beautiful, the good?' 'Yes,' he said. 'And of human beings like ourselves,
of water, fire, and the like?' 'I am not certain.' 'And would you be
undecided also about ideas of which the mention will, perhaps, appear
laughable: of hair, mud, filth, and other things which are base and vile?'
'No, Parmenides; visible things like these are, as I believe, only what
they appear to be: though I am sometimes disposed to imagine that
there is nothing without an idea; but I repress any such notion, from a
fear of falling into an abyss of nonsense.' 'You are young, Socrates, and
therefore naturally regard the opinions of men; the time will come
when philosophy will have a firmer hold of you, and you will not
despise even the meanest things. But tell me, is your meaning that
things become like by partaking of likeness, great by partaking of
greatness, just and beautiful by partaking of justice and beauty, and so
of other ideas?' 'Yes, that is my meaning.' 'And do you suppose the
individual to partake of the whole, or of the part?' 'Why not of the
whole?' said Socrates. 'Because,' said Parmenides, 'in that case the
whole, which is one, will become many.' 'Nay,' said Socrates, 'the
whole may be like the day, which is one and in many places: in this
way the ideas may be one and also many.' 'In the same sort of way,'
said Parmenides, 'as a sail, which is one, may be a cover to many--that
is your meaning?' 'Yes.' 'And would you say that each man is covered
by the whole sail, or by a part only?' 'By a part.' 'Then the ideas have
parts, and the objects partake of a part of them only?' 'That seems to
follow.' 'And would you like to say that the ideas are really divisible
and yet remain one?' 'Certainly not.' 'Would you venture to affirm that
great objects have a portion only of greatness transferred to them; or
that small or equal objects are small or equal because they are only
portions of smallness or equality?' 'Impossible.' 'But how can

individuals participate in ideas, except in the ways which I have
mentioned?' 'That is not an easy question to