Memoirs of General Sherman, vol 2 | Page 9

I inferred from the purport of our conversation
here and at Cincinnati.
First, I am pushing stores to the front with all possible dispatch, and am
completing the army organization according to the orders from
Washington, which are ample and perfectly satisfactory.
It will take us all of April to get in our furloughed veterans, to bring up
A. J. Smith's command, and to collect provisions and cattle on the line
of the Tennessee. Each of the armies will guard, by detachments of its
own, its rear communications.
At the signal to be given by you, Schofield, leaving a select garrison at
Knoxville and London, with twelve thousand men will drop down to

the Hiawassee, and march against Johnston's right by the old Federal
road. Stoneman, now in Kentucky, organizing the cavalry forces of the
Army of the Ohio, will operate with Schofield on his left front--it may
be, pushing a select body of about two thousand cavalry by Ducktown
or Elijah toward Athena, Georgia.
Thomas will aim to have forty-five thousand men of all arms, and
move straight against Johnston, wherever he may be, fighting him
cautiously, persistently, and to the best advantage. He will have two
divisions of cavalry, to take advantage of any offering.
McPherson will have nine divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, if A.
J. Smith gets here, in which case he will have full thirty thousand of the
best men in America. He will cross the Tennessee at Decatur and
Whitesburg, march toward Rome, and feel for Thomas. If Johnston
falls behind the Coosa, then McPherson will push for Rome; and if
Johnston falls behind the Chattahoochee, as I believe he will, then
McPherson will cross over and join Thomas.
McPherson has no cavalry, but I have taken one of Thomas's divisions,
viz., Garrard's, six thousand strong, which is now at Colombia,
mounting, equipping, and preparing. I design this division to operate on
McPheraon's right, rear, or front, according as the enemy appears. But
the moment I detect Johnston falling behind the Chattahoochee, I
propose to cast off the effective part of this cavalry division, after
crossing the Coosa, straight for Opelika, West Point, Columbus, or
Wetumpka, to break up the road between Montgomery and Georgia. If
Garrard can do this work well, he can return to the Union army; but
should a superior force interpose, then he will seek safety at Pensacola
and join Banks, or, after rest, will act against any force that he can find
east of Mobile, till such time as he can reach me.
Should Johnston fall behind the Chattahoochee, I will feign to the right,
but pass to the left and act against Atlanta or its eastern
communications, according to developed facts.
This is about as far ahead as I feel disposed, to look, but I will ever bear
in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy that he cannot in
any event send any part of his command against you or Banks.
If Banks can at the same time carry Mobile and open up the Alabama
River, he will in a measure solve the most difficult part of my problem,
viz., "provisions." But in that I must venture. Georgia has a million of

inhabitants. If they can live, we should not starve. If the enemy
interrupt our communications, I will be absolved from all obligations to
subsist on our own resources, and will feel perfectly justified in taking
whatever and wherever we can find. I will inspire my command, if
successful, with the feeling that beef and salt are all that is absolutely
necessary to life, and that parched corn once fed General Jackson's
army on that very ground. As ever, your friend and servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CULPEPPER COURT HOUSE, VIRGINIA, April 19, 1864.
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of
the Mississippi.
GENERAL: Since my letter to you of April 4th I have seen no reason
to change any portion of the general plan of campaign, if the enemy
remain still and allow us to take the initiative. Rain has continued so
uninterruptedly until the last day or two that it will be impossible to
move, however, before the 27th, even if no more should fall in the
meantime. I think Saturday, the 30th, will probably be the day for our
general move.
Colonel Comstock, who will take this, can spend a day with you, and
fill up many little gaps of information not given in any of my letters.
What I now want more particularly to say is, that if the two main
attacks, yours and the one from here, should promise great success, the
enemy may, in a fit of desperation, abandon one part of their line of
defense, and