History of the United Netherlands, 1600-09 | Page 2

The opportunity seemed tempting to strike a great blow. How could
Albert and Isabella, with an empty exchequer and a mutinous army,
hope either to defend their soil from attack or to aim a counter blow at
the republic, even if, the republic for a season should be deprived of a
portion of its defenders?
The reasoning was plausible, the prize tempting. The States-General,
who habitually discountenanced rashness, and were wont to impose
superfluous restraints upon the valiant but discreet Lewis William, and
upon the deeply pondering but energetic Maurice, were now grown as
ardent as they had hitherto been hesitating. In the early days of June it
was determined in secret session to organize a great force in Holland
and Zeeland, and to embark suddenly for Nieuport, to carry that
important position by surprise or assault, and from that basis to redeem
Dunkirk. The possession of these two cities, besides that of Ostend,
which had always been retained by the Republic, would ensure the
complete subjugation of Flanders. The trifling force of two thousand
men under Rivas--all that the archduke then had in that province--and
the sconces and earthworks which had been constructed around Ostend
to impede the movements and obstruct the supplies of the garrison,
would be utterly powerless to prevent the consummation of the plan.
Flanders once subjugated, it would not be long before the Spaniards
were swept from the obedient Netherlands as thoroughly as they had
been from the domains of the commonwealth, and all the seventeen
provinces, trampling out every vestige of a hated foreign tyranny,
would soon take their natural place as states of a free; prosperous, and
powerful union.
But Maurice of Nassau did not share the convictions of the States-
General. The unwonted ardour of Barneveld did not inflame his
imagination. He urged that the enterprise was inexcusably rash; that its
execution would require the whole army of the States, except the
slender garrisons absolutely necessary to protect important places from
surprise; that a defeat would not be simply disaster, but annihilation;
that retreat without absolute triumph would be impossible, and that
amid such circumstances the archduke, in spite of his poverty and the
rebellious condition of his troops, would doubtless assemble a
sufficient force to dispute with reasonable prospects of victory, this

invasion of his territory.
Sir Francis Vere, too, was most decidedly opposed to the plan. He
pointed out with great clearness its dangerous and possibly fatal
character; assuring the Staten that, within a fortnight after the
expedition had begun, the archduke would follow upon their heels with
an army fully able to cope with the best which they could put into the
field. But besides this experienced and able campaigner, who so
thoroughly shared the opinions of Prince Maurice, every military man
in the provinces of any consideration, was opposed to, the scheme.
Especially Lewis William--than whom no more sagacious military
critic or accomplished strategist existed in Europe, denounced it with
energy and even with indignation. It was, in the opinion of the young
stadholder of Friesland, to suspend the existence of the whole
commonwealth upon a silken thread. Even success, he prophesied,
would bring no permanent, fruits, while the consequences of an
overthrow, were fearful to contemplate. The immediate adherents and
most trusted counsellors of William Lewis were even more unmeasured
in their denunciations than he was himself. "'Tis all the work of
Barneveld and the long-gowns," cried Everard van Reyd. "We are led
into a sack from which there is no extrication. We are marching to the
Caudine Forks."
Certainly it is no small indication of the vast influence and the
indomitable resolution of Barneveld that he never faltered in this storm
of indignation. The Advocate had made up his mind to invade Flanders
and to capture Nieuport; and the decree accordingly went forth, despite
all opposition. The States-General were sovereign, and the Advocate
and the States-General were one.
It was also entirely characteristic of Maurice that he should submit his
judgment on this great emergency to that of Olden-Barneveld. It was
difficult for him to resist the influence of the great intellect to which he
had always willingly deferred in affairs of state, and from which; even
in military matters, it was hardly possible for him to escape. Yet in
military matters Maurice was a consummate professor, and the
Advocate in comparison but a school-boy.
The ascendency of Barneveld was the less wholesome, therefore, and it
might have been better had the stadholder manifested more resolution.
But Maurice had not a resolute character. Thorough soldier as he was,

he was singularly vacillating, at times almost infirm of purpose, but
never before in his career had this want of decision manifested itself in
so striking a manner.
Accordingly the States-General, or in other words John of
Olden-Barneveld proposed to