Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion | Page 8

philosophical sceptics fall into an inconsistence of an opposite nature. They push
their researches into the most abstruse corners of science; and their assent attends them in
every step, proportioned to the evidence which they meet with. They are even obliged to
acknowledge, that the most abstruse and remote objects are those which are best
explained by philosophy. Light is in reality anatomised. The true system of the heavenly
bodies is discovered and ascertained. But the nourishment of bodies by food is still an
inexplicable mystery. The cohesion of the parts of matter is still incomprehensible. These
sceptics, therefore, are obliged, in every question, to consider each particular evidence
apart, and proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which occurs. This is
their practice in all natural, mathematical, moral, and political science. And why not the
same, I ask, in the theological and religious? Why must conclusions of this nature be
alone rejected on the general presumption of the insufficiency of human reason, without
any particular discussion of the evidence? Is not such an unequal conduct a plain proof of
prejudice and passion?
Our senses, you say, are fallacious; our understanding erroneous; our ideas, even of the
most familiar objects, extension, duration, motion, full of absurdities and contradictions.
You defy me to solve the difficulties, or reconcile the repugnancies which you discover
in them. I have not capacity for so great an undertaking: I have not leisure for it: I
perceive it to be superfluous. Your own conduct, in every circumstance, refutes your
principles, and shows the firmest reliance on all the received maxims of science, morals,
prudence, and behaviour.
I shall never assent to so harsh an opinion as that of a celebrated writer [L'Arte de penser],
who says, that the Sceptics are not a sect of philosophers: They are only a sect of liars. I
may, however, affirm (I hope without offence), that they are a sect of jesters or raillers.
But for my part, whenever I find myself disposed to mirth and amusement, I shall
certainly choose my entertainment of a less perplexing and abstruse nature. A comedy, a
novel, or at most a history, seems a more natural recreation than such metaphysical
subtleties and abstractions.
In vain would the sceptic make a distinction between science and common life, or
between one science and another. The arguments employed in all, if just, are of a similar
nature, and contain the same force and evidence. Or if there be any difference among
them, the advantage lies entirely on the side of theology and natural religion. Many
principles of mechanics are founded on very abstruse reasoning; yet no man who has any
pretensions to science, even no speculative sceptic, pretends to entertain the least doubt
with regard to them. The COPERNICAN system contains the most surprising paradox,
and the most contrary to our natural conceptions, to appearances, and to our very senses:

yet even monks and inquisitors are now constrained to withdraw their opposition to it.
And shall PHILO, a man of so liberal a genius and extensive knowledge, entertain any
general undistinguished scruples with regard to the religious hypothesis, which is
founded on the simplest and most obvious arguments, and, unless it meets with artificial
obstacles, has such easy access and admission into the mind of man?
And here we may observe, continued he, turning himself towards DEMEA, a pretty
curious circumstance in the history of the sciences. After the union of philosophy with
the popular religion, upon the first establishment of Christianity, nothing was more usual,
among all religious teachers, than declamations against reason, against the senses, against
every principle derived merely from human research and inquiry. All the topics of the
ancient academics were adopted by the fathers; and thence propagated for several ages in
every school and pulpit throughout Christendom. The Reformers embraced the same
principles of reasoning, or rather declamation; and all panegyrics on the excellency of
faith, were sure to be interlarded with some severe strokes of satire against natural reason.
A celebrated prelate [Monsr. Huet] too, of the Romish communion, a man of the most
extensive learning, who wrote a demonstration of Christianity, has also composed a
treatise, which contains all the cavils of the boldest and most determined PYRRHONISM.
LOCKE seems to have been the first Christian who ventured openly to assert, that faith
was nothing but a species of reason; that religion was only a branch of philosophy; and
that a chain of arguments, similar to that which established any truth in morals, politics,
or physics, was always employed in discovering all the principles of theology, natural
and revealed. The ill use which BAYLE and other libertines made of the philosophical
scepticism of the fathers and first reformers, still further propagated the judicious
sentiment of Mr. LOCKE: And it