Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion | Page 6

these theological doctrines, and there acquire a
superior force and authority. Whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you
pretend, we shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up: We shall then see,
whether you go out at the door or the window; and whether you really doubt if your body
has gravity, or can be injured by its fall; according to popular opinion, derived from our
fallacious senses, and more fallacious experience. And this consideration, DEMEA, may,
I think, fairly serve to abate our ill-will to this humorous sect of the sceptics. If they be
thoroughly in earnest, they will not long trouble the world with their doubts, cavils, and
disputes: If they be only in jest, they are, perhaps, bad raillers; but can never be very
dangerous, either to the state, to philosophy, or to religion.
In reality, PHILO, continued he, it seems certain, that though a man, in a flush of humour,
after intense reflection on the many contradictions and imperfections of human reason,

may entirely renounce all belief and opinion, it is impossible for him to persevere in this
total scepticism, or make it appear in his conduct for a few hours. External objects press
in upon him; passions solicit him; his philosophical melancholy dissipates; and even the
utmost violence upon his own temper will not be able, during any time, to preserve the
poor appearance of scepticism. And for what reason impose on himself such a violence?
This is a point in which it will be impossible for him ever to satisfy himself, consistently
with his sceptical principles. So that, upon the whole, nothing could be more ridiculous
than the principles of the ancient PYRRHONIANS; if in reality they endeavoured, as is
pretended, to extend, throughout, the same scepticism which they had learned from the
declamations of their schools, and which they ought to have confined to them.
In this view, there appears a great resemblance between the sects of the STOICS and
PYRRHONIANS, though perpetual antagonists; and both of them seem founded on this
erroneous maxim, That what a man can perform sometimes, and in some dispositions, he
can perform always, and in every disposition. When the mind, by Stoical reflections, is
elevated into a sublime enthusiasm of virtue, and strongly smit with any species of
honour or public good, the utmost bodily pain and sufferings will not prevail over such a
high sense of duty; and it is possible, perhaps, by its means, even to smile and exult in the
midst of tortures. If this sometimes may be the case in fact and reality, much more may a
philosopher, in his school, or even in his closet, work himself up to such an enthusiasm,
and support in imagination the acutest pain or most calamitous event which he can
possibly conceive. But how shall he support this enthusiasm itself? The bent of his mind
relaxes, and cannot be recalled at pleasure; avocations lead him astray; misfortunes attack
him unawares; and the philosopher sinks by degrees into the plebeian.
I allow of your comparison between the STOICS and SKEPTICS, replied PHILO. But
you may observe, at the same time, that though the mind cannot, in Stoicism, support the
highest flights of philosophy, yet, even when it sinks lower, it still retains somewhat of its
former disposition; and the effects of the Stoic's reasoning will appear in his conduct in
common life, and through the whole tenor of his actions. The ancient schools, particularly
that of ZENO, produced examples of virtue and constancy which seem astonishing to
present times.
Vain Wisdom all and false Philosophy. Yet with a pleasing sorcery could charm Pain, for
a while, or anguish; and excite Fallacious Hope, or arm the obdurate breast With stubborn
Patience, as with triple steel.
In like manner, if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical considerations on the
uncertainty and narrow limits of reason, he will not entirely forget them when he turns his
reflection on other subjects; but in all his philosophical principles and reasoning, I dare
not say in his common conduct, he will be found different from those, who either never
formed any opinions in the case, or have entertained sentiments more favourable to
human reason.
To whatever length any one may push his speculative principles of scepticism, he must
act, I own, and live, and converse, like other men; and for this conduct he is not obliged
to give any other reason, than the absolute necessity he lies under of so doing. If he ever
carries his speculations further than this necessity constrains him, and philosophises
either on natural or moral subjects, he is allured by a certain pleasure and satisfaction
which he finds in employing himself after that manner. He considers besides, that every
one, even in common