Cratylus | Page 9

false propositions. If a whole proposition be true
or false, then the parts of a proposition may be true or false, and the
least parts as well as the greatest; and the least parts are names, and
therefore names may be true or false. Would Hermogenes maintain that
anybody may give a name to anything, and as many names as he
pleases; and would all these names be always true at the time of giving
them? Hermogenes replies that this is the only way in which he can
conceive that names are correct; and he appeals to the practice of
different nations, and of the different Hellenic tribes, in confirmation of
his view. Socrates asks, whether the things differ as the words which
represent them differ:-- Are we to maintain with Protagoras, that what
appears is? Hermogenes has always been puzzled about this, but
acknowledges, when he is pressed by Socrates, that there are a few very
good men in the world, and a great many very bad; and the very good
are the wise, and the very bad are the foolish; and this is not mere
appearance but reality. Nor is he disposed to say with Euthydemus, that
all things equally and always belong to all men; in that case, again,
there would be no distinction between bad and good men. But then, the
only remaining possibility is, that all things have their several distinct
natures, and are independent of our notions about them. And not only
things, but actions, have distinct natures, and are done by different
processes. There is a natural way of cutting or burning, and a natural
instrument with which men cut or burn, and any other way will
fail;--this is true of all actions. And speaking is a kind of action, and
naming is a kind of speaking, and we must name according to a natural
process, and with a proper instrument. We cut with a knife, we pierce

with an awl, we weave with a shuttle, we name with a name. And as a
shuttle separates the warp from the woof, so a name distinguishes the
natures of things. The weaver will use the shuttle well,--that is, like a
weaver; and the teacher will use the name well,--that is, like a teacher.
The shuttle will be made by the carpenter; the awl by the smith or
skilled person. But who makes a name? Does not the law give names,
and does not the teacher receive them from the legislator? He is the
skilled person who makes them, and of all skilled workmen he is the
rarest. But how does the carpenter make or repair the shuttle, and to
what will he look? Will he not look at the ideal which he has in his
mind? And as the different kinds of work differ, so ought the
instruments which make them to differ. The several kinds of shuttles
ought to answer in material and form to the several kinds of webs. And
the legislator ought to know the different materials and forms of which
names are made in Hellas and other countries. But who is to be the
judge of the proper form? The judge of shuttles is the weaver who uses
them; the judge of lyres is the player of the lyre; the judge of ships is
the pilot. And will not the judge who is able to direct the legislator in
his work of naming, be he who knows how to use the names--he who
can ask and answer questions--in short, the dialectician? The pilot
directs the carpenter how to make the rudder, and the dialectician
directs the legislator how he is to impose names; for to express the
ideal forms of things in syllables and letters is not the easy task,
Hermogenes, which you imagine.
'I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me this natural
correctness of names.'
Indeed I cannot; but I see that you have advanced; for you now admit
that there is a correctness of names, and that not every one can give a
name. But what is the nature of this correctness or truth, you must learn
from the Sophists, of whom your brother Callias has bought his
reputation for wisdom rather dearly; and since they require to be paid,
you, having no money, had better learn from him at second-hand. 'Well,
but I have just given up Protagoras, and I should be inconsistent in
going to learn of him.' Then if you reject him you may learn of the
poets, and in particular of Homer, who distinguishes the names given

by Gods and men to the same things, as in the verse about the river God
who fought with Hephaestus, 'whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men
call Scamander;' or in the lines in which