Chancellorsville and Gettysburg | Page 3

of absence had expired. In
this way he almost stopped the desertion which had been so prevalent
under Burnside. Only one portion of the army was dissatisfied; the
position recently occupied by General Franz Sigel, the favorite
commander of the Eleventh Corps, had been given to General O. O.
Howard. The numerous Germans in that corps were discontented at the
change. They cared little for Howard's reputation as the Havelock of
the army; an appellation he had gained from his zeal as a
Congregationalist. They felt, when their countryman Sigel was
deprived of his command, that it was a blow to their nationality, and
therefore lost some of the enthusiasm which always accompanies the
personal influence of a popular leader.
The rainy season was nearly over, the time had come for action, and it
was essential to strike a decisive blow before the term of service of the
nine months' and two years' men had drawn to a close. Hooker's plan of
campaign was simple, efficacious, and should have been successful.
The rebels occupied a long line and could not be strong everywhere. He
resolved to make a pretence of crossing with three corps, under
Major-General Sedgwick, below Fredericksburg, while the remaining
four corps under Major-General Slocum made a detour and crossed
twenty-seven miles above at Kelly's Ford. The latter were then to

march down the river against the left flank of the rebel army and
re-open Banks' Ford; thus re-uniting the two wings of the army and
giving a secure line of retreat in case of disaster. When this was
accomplished it was proposed to give battle in the open country near
the ford, the position there being a commanding one and taking the
whole line of rebel works on the heights of Fredericksburg in reverse.
Owing to his great preponderance of force, Hooker had little reason to
doubt that the result would be favorable to our arms. To carry out this
plan and make it a complete surprise to the enemy it became necessary
to leave Gibbon's division of Couch's corps behind, for as his
encampment at Falmouth was in full view of the Confederate forces on
the opposite side, to withdraw it would have been to notify them that
some unusual movement was going on. So far the idea was simply to
crush the opposing army, but Hooker's plan went farther and involved
the capture of Lee's entire force. To accomplish this he directed
Stoneman to start two weeks in advance of the main body with ten
thousand cavalry, cross at the upper fords of the Rappahannock, and
sweep down upon Lee's communications with Richmond, breaking up
railroads and canals, cutting telegraph wires, and intercepting supplies
of all kinds. As the rebel commissariat found great difficulty in keeping
more than four days' rations on hand at a time, Stoneman's raid would
almost necessarily force Lee to fall back on his depots and give up
Fredericksburg. One column under Averell was to attack Culpeper and
Gordonsville, the other under Buford to move to Louisa Court House,
and thence to the Fredericksburg Railroad. Both columns were to unite
behind the Pamunkey, and in case our army was successful Stoneman
was directed to plant his force behind some river in an advantageous
position on Lee's line of retreat, where he could detain the rebel army
until Hooker could again assail it and compel it to surrender. A brave
programme! Let us see how it was carried out.
It was an essential part of Hooker's project that the cavalry should
begin operations two weeks before the infantry. If they did their work
thoroughly, Lee would be out of provisions, and his retreat would give
us all the moral effect of a victory. The rebel cavalry at the time being
reduced to about 3,000 men, it was not supposed that Stoneman would
encounter any serious resistance. He accordingly started on April 13th

to carry out his instructions, but another rain storm, which made the
river unfordable, and very bad roads, detained him until the 28th. It has
been suggested that he might have crossed higher up, but cavalry
officers who were there, tell me that every ravine had become an
impassable river. Hooker became impatient and refused to wait any
longer; so when the water subsided, all--infantry, artillery, and
cavalry--were sent over together. The result was that the battle was
ended before Stoneman got fairly to work, and his operations had little
or no effect in obstructing Lee's movements.
To confuse the enemy as much as possible, demonstrations had been
made at both ends of the line. On April 21st a small infantry force was
sent to threaten Kelly's Ford. On the same day, I went with part of my
division down the river to Port Conway, opposite Port Royal, twenty
miles below Fredericksburg,