Cecil Rhodes | Page 4

property.
In any judgment on South Africa one must never forget that, after all,
before the war did the work of a scavenger it was nothing else but a
vast mining camp, with all its terrifying moods, its abject defects, and
its indifference with regard to morals and to means. The first men who
began to exploit the riches of that vast territory contrived in a relatively
easy way to build up their fortunes upon a solid basis, but many of their
followers, eager to walk in their steps, found difficulties upon which
they had not reckoned or even thought about. In order to put them aside
they used whatever means lay in their power, without hesitation as to
whether these answered to the principles of honesty and
straightforwardness. Their ruthless conduct was so far advantageous to
their future schemes that it inspired disgust among those whose
ancestors had sought a prosperity founded on hard work and
conscientious toil. These good folk retired from the field, leaving it free
to the adventurers who were to give such a bad name to England and
who boasted loudly that they had been given full powers to do what
they liked in the way of conquering a continent which, but for them,
would have been only too glad to place itself under English protection
and English rule. To these people, and to these alone, were due all the
antagonisms which at last brought about the Boer War.
It was with these people that Sir Alfred Milner found himself out of
harmony; from the first moment that he had set his foot on African soil
they tried to put difficulties in his way, after they had convinced
themselves that he would never consent to lend himself to their
schemes.
Lord Milner has never belonged to the class of men who allow
themselves to be influenced either by wealth or by the social position of
anyone. He is perhaps one of the best judges of humanity it has been
my fortune to meet, and though by no means an unkind judge, yet a
very fair one. Intrigue is repulsive to him, and unless I am very much
mistaken I venture to affirm that, in the 'nineties, because of the
intrigues in which they indulged, he grew to loathe some of the men
with whom he was thrown into contact. Yet he could not help seeing

that these reckless speculators controlled public opinion in South
Africa, and his political instinct compelled him to avail himself of their
help, as without them he would not have been able to arrive at a proper
understanding of the entanglements and complications of South African
politics.
Previous to Sir Alfred's appointment as Governor of the Cape of Good
Hope the office had been filled by men who, though of undoubted
integrity and high standing, were yet unable to gauge the volume of
intrigue with which they had to cope from those who had already
established an iron--or, rather, golden--rule in South Africa.
Coteries of men whose sole aim was the amassing of quick fortunes
were virtual rulers of Cape Colony, with more power than the
Government to whom they simulated submission. All sorts of weird
stories were in circulation. One popular belief was that the mutiny of
the Dutch in Cape Colony just before the Boer War was at bottom due
to the influence of money. This was followed by a feeling that, but for
the aggressive operations of the outpost agents of certain commercial
magnates, it would have been possible for England to realise the Union
of South Africa by peaceful means instead of the bloody arbitrament of
war.
In the minds of many Dutchmen--and Dutchmen who were sincerely
patriotic Transvaalers--the conviction was strong that the natural
capabilities of Boers did not lie in the direction of developing, as they
could be, the amazing wealth-producing resources of the Transvaal and
of the Orange Free State. By British help alone, such men believed,
could their country hope to thrive as it ought.
Here, then, was the nucleus around which the peaceful union of Boer
and English peoples in South Africa could be achieved without
bloodshed. Indeed, had Queen Victoria been represented at the Cape by
Sir Alfred Milner ten years before he was appointed Governor there,
many things which had a disastrous influence on the Dutch elements in
South Africa would not have occurred. The Jameson Raid would
certainly not have been planned and attempted. To this incident can be
ascribed much of the strife and unpleasantness which followed, by

which was lost to the British Government the chance, then fast ripening,
of bringing about without difficulty a reconciliation of Dutch and
English all over South Africa. This reconciliation would have been
achieved through Cecil Rhodes, and would have been a fitting