CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 8

prevented it, and, if so, did
they make any efforts to do so?

What the Americans did and did not know becomes clear in the
message traffic immediately following the murder. A cable of 22
October relates intelligence to the effect that Viaux's gang had been
told that their coup attempt was to be carried out that day, and that it
would be initiated by "something big" that would take place in the early
morning hours. The cable continued by speculating, after the fact, that
"the assassination attempt on General Schneider, Commander-in-Chief
of the Army . . . was very likely the 'something big' which the plotters
hoped to use to initiate their coup efforts." [73]
The uncertainty of the CIA can be ascribed both to lack of contact with
Viaux and a reduction in intelligence-gathering assets. The CIA had
started to pull out its false-flag officers from Chile a week before
Schneider's death, a move one would think unlikely if the Agency was
aware of a specific coup attempt. A memo dated 19 October 1970 states:
"[Co-optee] not at all sanguine re chances perventing (sic) Allende
from taking office and stressed fact that abortive coup now could spell
end to any chance of success in future . . . [CIA agent] has done his
work well and there are no further tasks for the false-flaggers at this
time he will be instructed depart Santiago [del] October . . ." [74]
Moreover, as of 21 October, the COS in Santiago was developing
post-inauguration asset-management plans. [75]
The record shows that the kidnapping took the station by surprise and
that the CIA did not have absolute knowledge of Schneider's attackers.
A cable, written on 3 November 1970, discussed a review of the
kidnapping attempt by the COS in Santiago, which stated that a
particular Chilean contact "confirmed neither he nor [name sec del]
involved in Schneider assassination." [76] If the CIA station was still
discussing who may or may not have been involved in the attack, and
was seeking confirmation from its Chilean contacts, that indicates they
did not have firm knowledge to begin with. If they had planned the
attack, as some accounts maintain, would they not have known who
executed the plan? Another cable discusses their lack of knowledge:
Station unaware if assassination was premeditated or whether it
constituted bungled abduction attempt . . . We know that Gen.

Valenzuela was involved [sec del] we have reason for believing that
Gen Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in, but cannot prove or
disprove that execution of attempt against Schneider was entrusted to
elements linked with Viaux. Important factor to bear in mind is that
Armed Forces, and not retired officers or extreme rightists, set
Schneider up for execution or abduction . . . Before trying to anticipate
further course of events station would like to await events of 23rd Oct.
which will obviously be decisive. [77]
Uncertain who had carried out the attack, the CIA worried that the
weapons it had provided to Valenzuela's group might have been
responsible for Schneider's death. Were the American weapons in fact
used in the kidnapping attempt that turned into murder? The answer
appears to be no. One CIA cable from Chile, sent on 29 October, hints
at the confusion in Santiago in the aftermath of the assassination, and
the trouble it caused station officers in determining what was going on.
The message says that marshal law made their work difficult, but that
on 28 October, they were "able to make first contact with [name
deleted] . . . [deletion] stated that when first heard of Schneider's
assassination on radio he was quite upset but has since been informed
by [name deleted] that three machine guns and ammunition are still in
[name deleted]'s home and never given to anybody. . . . Also [name
deleted] still has three tear-gas canisters and three masks." [78]
A CIA review of its own actions, undertaken in 1973, states that "three
submachine-guns were provided to three military officers who planned
to use them in instigating an uprising by the Armed Forces. This
program was conducted at the request of President Nixon with the
understanding that it was not to become known to the State Department
or other members of the 40 Committee." [79] This is all true, but were
the weapons given purposefully to assassinate Schneider? The CIA and
the White House did not want Schneider assassinated. Documents from
early October reveal that Washington understood that his death would
benefit Allende more than it would his opposition by rallying "the army
fully behind the flag of constitutionalism." [80] They trusted
Valenzuela to carry out a kidnapping, but not Viaux, and to the last
minute they attempted to keep Viaux from moving on his own. [81]

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