CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 5

for there were routine
exhortations on the "seriousness of USG intent to attempt deny [the]
presidency to Allende." [40] The CIA wanted the Chileans to do it on
their own, but found Viaux's plans "to be totally inadequate." [41]
Another problem with Viaux was his high profile as an anti-communist
agitator. Having already led one military revolt, he was under constant
scrutiny by the state security apparatus, which made clandestine contact
by the Americans dangerous. "It station's firm opinion that further
contact with [name deleted] presents too great a risk potential and
offers very little in return. Considering the way the [defense
attachŽ]-Viaux relationship is unfolding we feel [attachŽ] contact not
worth maintaining . . . as we approach the 24th of October [Viaux] will
just be too hot to handle." [42] To make matters worse, the CIA knew
that the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) had agents infiltrated close
to Viaux and his associates. It would be foolish of Washington to offer
Viaux continued support if the PCCh would later be able to disclose
American activities. [43] Viaux was a disaster waiting to happen and
had to be kept at a distance.
While the CIA wanted to keep Viaux at arm's length, the pressure on
Agency officers in Santiago to come up with a "solution" to the
Allende problem was massive, as attested by many of the men who
worked in and around the project. [44] The problem was that there was
no viable candidate to take the lead. Viaux, clearly, was compulsive

and uncontrollable, probably even anti-American. [45] Valenzuela and
Huerta had no plans, no forces assembled, and were perhaps a bit
scared of moving. But the White House (the "highest levels" [46] ) was
demanding a solution, a military solution, and "all other considerations
are secondary." [47] Ê The Santiago CIA station sent back what can
only be called a cynical reply. It is worth quoting at length:
1. Station has arrived at Viaux solution by process of elimination: a.
Alto Mando (high command) solution cannot be achieved . . . b. [Frei
Solution] cannot be achieved . . . c. Regimental commander solution:
Station . . . lacks requisite leverage to pry loose most commanders from
their instinctive obedience to Alto Mando directives . . . 2. What can
Viaux accomplish under optimum conditions? He can split armed
forces . . . fencesitters will watch tide of battle before engaging
themselves on either side. Carnage would be considerable and
prolonged, i.e., civil war. Under best of circumstances, armed forces
will break up and create unpredictable situation . . . 5. Above not
intended to be exhaustive enumeration of some of key factors that
ought to have hearing on your final determination. You have asked us
to provoke chaos in Chile. Thru Viaux solution we provide you with
formula for chaos which unlikely to be bloodless. To dissimulate US
involvement will clearly be impossible. Station [CIA] team, as you
know, has given most serious consideration to all plans suggested by
HQs counterparts. We conclude that none of them stand even a remote
chance of achieving [USG] objective. Hence, Viaux gamble, despite
high risk factors, may commend itself to you." [48]
In three pages, the CIA COS in Santiago made dramatically clear the
problems he was facing in trying to carry out a near-impossible task.
Constructing a coup in a country where no one was willing to start the
action was possible, but not if the United States wanted its involvement
to remain secret, and certainly not if it wanted the action to be
bloodless. As far as the Santiago station was concerned, Viaux was a
no-win on all counts. Some days later, Santiago sent another message
to Langley: "Station would appreciate firm and realistic guidelines
from headquarters on what objectives to pursue in further dealings with
General Viaux." [49]

Reality Sinks In
Following this cable, CIA Headquarters initiated a series of study
papers looking more deeply into the implications of supporting Viaux.
The conclusions were not optimistic--one paper was titled "The Coup
that Failed: The Effects on Allende and his Political Posture." [50]
Reality was slowly sinking in at Langley and the White House:
In summary, there is little climate in Chile to encourage or sustain a
military move at this time, but Gen. Viaux continues to try with his
major problems apparently being: (a) a sure way of containing the
high command, especially Gen. Schneider in the early hours of a coup
attempt, and (b) a method of controlling the pro-Allende mobs which
very probably would swarm through downtown Santiago in the event of
a coup attempt. [51]
The bottom line was that a Viaux coup would almost certainly result in
American embarrassment and a strengthening of Allende's position.
Inputs from both the CIA COS in Santiago and Amb.