CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 
Reexamining the Record 
Kristian C. Gustafson 
From Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2003 - Unclassified 
Edition 
http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol47no3/ 
Editor's Note: Mr. Gustafson received the Studies in Intelligence 
Walter L. Pforzheimer Award for this article in 2002. The prize is given 
to the graduate or undergraduate student who submitted the best paper 
on an intelligence-related subject during the preceding year. 
* * * 
From 1970 to 1973, the United States government was involved in 
overt and covert actions against the elected government of Chile led by 
Marxist Salvador Allende. Unfolding events during these politically 
tumultuous years included the death of Chilean Minister of Defense 
RenŽ Schneider in October 1970. Ultimately, Allende was overthrown 
and replaced by Gen. Augusto Pinochet. The initial history of this 
period, recorded in the 1970s and early 1980s, told of a US government 
that abused its power and betrayed its principles. Public reaction was 
universally negative. This interpretation of events has affected the 
conduct and perception of American intelligence activities ever since. 
[1] 
A generation has now passed and it is time to reexamine this 
"accepted" version of events. Recently, the US government posted 
thousands of declassified documents to its on-line "Chile Collection." 
[2] These newly available resources allow a more candid--and 
realistic--look into the actions and thoughts of the CIA agents and
officers involved in those controversial operations. This study focuses 
on CIA covert action during the six weeks following Allende's victory 
at the polls in mid-September 1970. While the activities of the CIA 
may not always be excused, they can at least be better understood. 
Genesis 
So sure were senior US officials that Salvador Allende and his coalition 
would be defeated in the September 1970 election, as he had been three 
times previously, that, despite CIA warnings, they were caught 
off-guard when he won a plurality. Undeterred by the voters' preference, 
President Richard Nixon delivered a clear and forceful Directive calling 
for expanded CIA operations in Chile. In the weeks between Allende's 
election and his inauguration planned for 3 November, the CIA actively 
sought to foment a coup in Chile. Washington was unequivocal about 
its desire to keep Allende from power. 
American actions against the Allende government occurred in what 
Nixon's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, called the 
"Autumn of Crises." [3] The Soviet Union was actively threatening 
American national security in several different arenas. Soviet missiles 
and technicians had been moved into Egypt. The rest of the Middle 
East was in chaos--Israeli attacks against its Arab neighbors were 
increasing daily, and Syria had attacked its supposed ally, Jordan. At 
the beginning of September, a large Soviet flotilla had arrived in 
Cienfuegos, Cuba: There was suspicion that the Soviets had designs on 
this harbor as a new submarine base in the Western Hemisphere. At a 
more global level, Washington was struggling to maintain momentum 
in the negotiations for the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. 
It was in this framework of global power plays between the Soviet 
Union and the United States that the White House had to deal with the 
election of a Marxist-oriented government in Chile. On 15 September 
1970, President Nixon called Kissinger, Director of Central Intelligence 
(DCI) Richard Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell into the 
Oval Office to provide executive guidance for US policy toward Chile 
and Allende. William Colby--then Deputy Director, later Director, of 
the CIA--noted that "Nixon was furious" and was convinced that an
Allende presidency would ensure the spread of Cuban President Fidel 
Castro's communist revolution to Chile and the rest of Latin America. 
[4] He wanted to prevent Allende from being inaugurated. The message 
he delivered at the meeting reflected his anger. The handwritten 
minutes taken by DCI Helms are revealing: 
One in 10 chance, perhaps, but save Chile: Worth Spending Not 
concerned risks involved No involvement of Embassy $10,000,000 
available, more if necessary full-time job--best men we have game plan 
make the economy scream 48 hours plan of action. [5] 
Helms, understanding the import of the President's statements, 
commented: "If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of 
the Oval Office, it was that day." [6] The Administration moved 
quickly to implement the Presidential Directive. Kissinger was to 
oversee the project, which was to be called "Track II" to differentiate it 
from the ongoing diplomatic and related efforts to thwart communist 
influence in Chile, known as "Track I." 
When Allende's candidacy was announced in early 1970, the State 
Department had developed a policy to try to dampen Marxist electoral 
prospects. This approach--Track I--primarily involved efforts by the US 
Ambassador and his diplomatic staff to hinder Allende through the 
manipulation of Chilean congressmen and senators within the 
framework of the Chilean constitution. At the time, the State 
Department made a conscious decision to exclude the CIA from the 
planning    
    
		
	
	
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