Armageddon--And After | Page 9

as to make an alliance with an Asiatic
nation--Japan--in order to safeguard her Asiatic interests in India. Thus,
when diplomatists invoke the necessity of a Balance of Power, they are
really trying to work for a preponderance of power on their side. It is
inevitable that this should be so. An exact Balance of Power must result
in a stalemate.
CHANGE OF POLICY
Observe what has happened to Great Britain during recent years. When
she was ruled by that extremely clear-headed though obstinate
statesman, Lord Salisbury, she remained, at his advice, outside the
circle of continental entanglements and rejoiced in what was known as
a policy of "Splendid Isolation." It was, of course, a selfish policy. It
rested on sound geographical grounds, because, making use of the
fortunate accident that Great Britain is an island, it suggested that she
could pursue her own commercial career and, thanks to the English
Channel, let the whole of the rest of the world go hang. Such a position
could not possibly last, partly because Great Britain is not only an
island, but also an empire scattered over the seven seas; partly because
we could not remain alien from those social and economic interests
which necessarily link our career with continental nations. So we
became part of the continental system, and it became necessary for us
to choose friends and partners and mark off other peoples as our
enemies. It might have been possible a certain number of years ago for
us to join the Triple Alliance. At one time Prince Bülow seemed
anxious that we should do so, and Mr. Chamberlain on our side was by
no means unwilling. But gradually we discovered that Germany was
intensely jealous of us as a colonial power and as a great sea-power,

and for this reason, as well as for others, we preferred to compose our
ancient differences with France and promote an understanding between
English and French as the nearest of neighbours and the most
convenient of allies. Observe, however, that every step in the process
was a challenge, and a challenge which the rival aimed at could not
possibly ignore. The conclusion of the French Entente Cordiale in 1904,
the launching of the Dreadnought in 1906, the formation of the Russian
agreement in 1907, and certain changes which we made in our own
army were obviously intended as warnings to Germany that we were
dangerous people to attack.[5] Germany naturally sought reprisals in
her fashion, and gradually Europe was transformed into a huge armed
camp, divided into two powerful organisations which necessarily
watched each other with no friendly gaze.
[5] See The War of Steel and Gold, by H.N. Brailsford (Bell)--opening
chapter on "The Balance of Power."
BALANCE OR CONCERT?
I do not say that the course of events could possibly have been altered.
When once we became part of the continental system, it was necessary
for us to choose between friends and enemies. I only say that if
diplomacy calls itself an agency for preventing war, it cannot be said to
be altogether successful. Its famous doctrine of a Balance of Power is
in reality a mere phrase. If one combination be represented as X and the
other as Y, and X increases itself up to X^2, it becomes necessary that
Y should similarly increase itself to Y^2, a process which, clearly, does
not make for peace. I should imagine that the best of diplomatists are
quite aware of this. Indeed, there seems reason to suppose that Sir
Edward Grey, owing to definite experience in the last two years, not
only discovered the uselessness of the principle of a Balance of Power,
but did his best to substitute something entirely different--the Concert
of Europe. All the negotiations he conducted during and after the two
Balkan wars, his constant effort to summon London Conferences and
other things, were intended to create a Concert of European Powers,
discussing amongst themselves the best measures to secure the peace of
the world. Alas! the whole of the fabric was destroyed, the fair

prospects hopelessly clouded over, by the intemperate ambition of the
Kaiser, who, just because he believed that the Balance of Power was
favourable to himself, that Russia was unready, that France was
involved in serious domestic trouble, that England was on the brink of
civil war, set fire to the magazine and engineered the present colossal
explosion.
CONTROL OF FOREIGN POLICY
One cannot feel sure that diplomacy as hitherto recognised will be able,
or, indeed, ought to be able, to survive the shock. In this country, as in
others, diplomacy has been considered a highly specialised science,
which can only be conducted by trained men and by methods of entire
secrecy. As a mere matter of fact, England has far less control over her
foreign policy than