An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume I.

An Essay Concerning Humane
Understanding,
by John Locke

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Understanding,
Volume I., by John Locke This eBook is for the use of anyone
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Title: An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume I.
MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books I. and II. (of 4)
Author: John Locke
Release Date: January 6, 2004 [EBook #10615]
Language: English
Character set encoding: ASCII
*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HUMANE
UNDERSTANDING, V1 ***

Produced by Steve Harris and David Widger

AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMANE UNDERSTANDING
IN FOUR BOOKS
BY JOHN LOCKE
Quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias, quam ista
effutientem nauseare, atque ipsum sibi displicere. --Cic. De Natur. Deor.
1. i.
LONDON
Printed by Eliz. Holt, for Thomas Basset, at the George in Fleet Street,
near St. Dunstan's Church.
MDCXC

CONTENTS: [Based on the 2d Edition]
EPISTLE DEDICATORY TO THE EARL OF PEMBROKE
THE EPISTLE TO THE READER
INTRODUCTION
BOOK I. NEITHER PRINCIPLES NOR IDEAS ARE INNATE.
I. NO INNATE SPECULATIVE PRINCIPLES II. NO INNATE
PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES III. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
CONCERNING INNATE PRINCIPLES, BOTH SPECULATIVE
AND PRACTICAL

BOOK II. OF IDEAS.
I. OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL II. OF
SIMPLE IDEAS III. OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSATION IV. IDEA

OF SOLIDITY V. OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF DIVERS SENSES VI. OF
SIMPLE IDEAS OF REFLECTION ... VII. OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF
BOTH SENSATION AND REFLECTION VIII. SOME FURTHER
CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR SIMPLE IDEAS OF
SENSATION IX. OF PERCEPTION X. OF RETENTION XI. OF
DISCERNING, AND OTHER OPERATIONS OF THE MIND XII.
OF COMPLEX IDEAS XIII. OF SIMPLE MODES:--AND FIRST, OF
THE SIMPLE MODES OF THE IDEA OF SPACE XIV. IDEA OF
DURATION AND ITS SIMPLE MODES XV. IDEAS OF
DURATION AND EXPANSION, CONSIDERED TOGETHER XVI.
IDEA OF NUMBER AND ITS SIMPLE MODES XVII. OF THE
IDEA OF INFINITY XVIII. OF OTHER SIMPLE MODES XIX. OF
THE MODES OF THINKING XX. OF MODES OF PLEASURE
AND PAIN XXI. OF THE IDEA OF POWER XXII. OF MIXED
MODES XXIII. OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES
XXIV. OF COLLECTIVE IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES XXV. OF
IDEAS OF RELATION XXVI. OF IDEAS OF CAUSE AND EFFECT,
AND OTHER RELATIONS XXVII. OF IDEAS OF IDENTITY AND
DIVERSITY XXVIII. OF IDEAS OF OTHER RELATIONS XXIX.
OF CLEAR AND OBSCURE, DISTINCT AND CONFUSED IDEAS
XXX. OF REAL AND FANTASTICAL IDEAS XXXI. OF
ADEQUATE AND INADEQUATE IDEAS XXXII. OF TRUE AND
FALSE IDEAS XXXIII. OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS
TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE
AND MONTGOMERY, BARON HERBERT OF CARDIFF LORD
ROSS, OF KENDAL, PAR, FITZHUGH, MARMION, ST. QUINTIN,
AND SHURLAND;
LORD PRESIDENT OF HIS MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE
PRIVY COUNCIL; AND LORD LIEUTENANT OF THE COUNTY
OF WILTS, AND OF SOUTH WALES.
MY LORD,
This Treatise, which is grown up under your lordship's eye, and has
ventured into the world by your order, does now, by a natural kind of
right, come to your lordship for that protection which you several years

since promised it. It is not that I think any name, how great soever, set
at the beginning of a book, will be able to cover the faults that are to be
found in it. Things in print must stand and fall by their own worth, or
the reader's fancy. But there being nothing more to be desired for truth
than a fair unprejudiced hearing, nobody is more likely to procure me
that than your lordship, who are allowed to have got so intimate an
acquaintance with her, in her more retired recesses. Your lordship is
known to have so far advanced your speculations in the most abstract
and general knowledge of things, beyond the ordinary reach or
common methods, that your allowance and approbation of the design of
this Treatise will at least preserve it from being condemned without
reading, and will prevail to have those parts a little weighed, which
might otherwise perhaps be thought to deserve no consideration, for
being somewhat out of the common road. The imputation of Novelty is
a terrible charge amongst those who judge of men's heads, as they do of
their perukes, by the fashion, and can allow none to be right but the
received doctrines. Truth scarce ever yet carried it by vote anywhere at
its first appearance: new opinions are always suspected, and usually
opposed, without any other reason but because they are not already
common. But truth, like gold, is not the less so for being newly brought
out of the mine. It is trial and examination must give it price, and not
any antique fashion; and though