A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson | Page 9

more and more or less and less closely with the
eyes made for us by utilitarian evolution: it is another to labour at
remaking for ourselves eyes capable of seeing, in order to see, and not
in order to live.
Philosophy understood in this manner--and we shall see more and more
clearly as we go on that there is no other legitimate method of
understanding it--demands from us an almost violent act of reform and

conversion.
The mind must turn round upon itself, invert the habitual direction of
its thought, climb the hill down which its instinct towards action has
carried it, and go to seek experience at its source, "above the critical
bend where it inclines towards our practical use and becomes, properly
speaking, human experience." ("Matter and Memory", page 203.) In
short, by a twin effort of criticism and expansion, it must pass outside
common-sense and synthetic understanding to return to pure intuition.
Philosophy consists in reliving the immediate over again, and in
interpreting our rational science and everyday perception by its light.
That, at least, is the first stage. We shall find afterwards that that is not
all.
Here is a genuinely new conception of philosophy. Here, for the first
time, philosophy is made specifically distinct from science, yet remains
no less positive.
What science really does is to preserve the general attitude of common-
sense, with its apparatus of forms and principles.
It is true that science develops and perfects it, refines and extends it,
and even now and again corrects it. But science does not change either
the direction or the essential steps.
In this philosophy, on the contrary, what is at first suspected and finally
modified, is the setting of the points before the journey begins.
Not that, in saying so, we mean to condemn science; but we must
recognise its just limits. The methods of science proper are in their
place and appropriate, and lead to a knowledge which is true (though
still symbolical), so long as the object studied is the world of practical
action, or, to put it briefly, the world of inert matter.
But soul, life, and activity escape it, and yet these are the spring and
ultimate basis of everything: and it is the appreciation of this fact, with
what it entails, that is new. And yet, new as Mr Bergson's conception of
philosophy may deservedly appear, it does not any the less, from
another point of view, deserve to be styled classic and traditional.
What it really defines is not so much a particular philosophy as
philosophy itself, in its original function.
Everywhere in history we find its secret current at its task.
All great philosophers have had glimpses of it, and employed it in
moments of discovery. Only as a general rule they have not clearly

recognised what they were doing, and so have soon turned aside.
But on this point I cannot insist without going into lengthy detail, and
am obliged to refer the reader to the fourth chapter of "Creative
Evolution", where he will find the whole question dealt with.
One remark, however, has still to be made. Philosophy, according to
Mr Bergson's conception, implies and demands time; it does not aim at
completion all at once, for the mental reform in question is of the kind
which requires gradual fulfilment. The truth which it involves does not
set out to be a non-temporal essence, which a sufficiently powerful
genius would be able, under pressure, to perceive in its entirety at one
view; and that again seems to be very new.
I do not, of course, wish to abuse systems of philosophy. Each of them
is an experience of thought, a moment in the life of thought, a method
of exploring reality, a reagent which reveals an aspect. Truth undergoes
analysis into systems as does light into colours.
But the mere name system calls up the static idea of a finished building.
Here there is nothing of the kind. The new philosophy desires to be a
proceeding as much as, and even more than, to be a system. It insists on
being lived as well as thought. It demands that thought should work at
living its true life, an inner life related to itself, effective, active, and
creative, but not on that account directed towards external action.
"And," says Mr Bergson, "it can only be constructed by the collective
and progressive effort of many thinkers, and of many observers,
completing, correcting, and righting one another." (Preface to "Creative
Evolution".)
Let us see how it begins, and what is its generating act.
III.
How are we to attain the immediate? How are we to realise this
perception of pure fact which we stated to be the philosopher's first
step?
Unless we can clear up this doubt, the end