The Discovery of a World in the Moone | Page 2

amongst the ancient variety and search of opinions, the best hath still
prevailed. Time (saith the learned Verulam) seemes to be of the nature
of a river or streame, which carrieth downe to us that which is light, or
blowne up, but sinketh that which is weighty and solid.
It is my desire that by the occasion of this discourse, I may raise up
some more active spirit to a search after other hidden and unknowne
truthes. Since it must needes be a great impediment unto the growth of
sciences, for men still so to plod on upon beaten principles, as to be
afraid of entertaining any thing that may seeme to contradict them. An
unwillingnesse to take such things into examination, is one of those
errours of learning in these times observed by the judicious Verulam.
Questionlesse there are many secret truths, which the ancients have
passed over, that are yet left to make some of our age famous for their
discovery.
If by this occasion I may provoke any reader to an attempt of this
nature, I shall then thinke my selfe happy, and this work successefull.
Farewell.

[Decoration]
The First Proposition, by way of Preface.
That the strangenesse of this opinion is no sufficient reason why it
should be rejected, because other certaine truths have beene formerly
esteemed ridiculous, and great absurdities entertayned by common
consent.
There is an earnestnesse and hungering after novelty, which doth still
adhere unto all our natures, and it is part of that primative image, that
wide extent and infinite capacity at first created in the heart of man, for
this since its depravation in Adam perceiving it selfe altogether emptied
of any good doth now catch after every new thing, conceiving that
possibly it may finde satisfaction among some of its fellow creatures.
But our enemy the divell (who strives still to pervert our gifts, and
beate us with our owne weapons) hath so contriv'd it, that any truth
doth now seeme distastefull for that very reason, for which errour is
entertain'd--Novelty, for let but some upstart heresie be set abroach,
and presently there are some out of a curious humour; others, as if they
watched an occasion of singularity, will take it up for canonicall, and
make it part of their creede and profession; whereas solitary truth
cannot any where finde so ready entertainement; but the same Novelty
which is esteemed the commendation of errour and makes that
acceptable, is counted the fault of truth, and causes that to bee rejected.
How did the incredulous World gaze at Columbus when hee promised
to discover another part of the earth, and he could not for a long time
by his confidence, or arguments, induce any of the Christian Princes,
either to assent unto his opinion, or goe to the charges of an experiment.
Now if he who had such good grounds for his assertion, could finde no
better entertainement among the wiser sort, and upper end of the World;
'tis not likely then that this opinion which I now deliver, shall receive
any thing from the men of these daies, especially our vulgar wits, but
misbeliefe or derision. It hath alwaies beene the unhappinesse of new
truths in Philosophy, to be derided by those that are ignorant of the
causes of things, and reiected by others whose perversenesse ties them
to the contrary opinion, men whose envious pride will not allow any

new thing for truth which they themselves were not the first inventors
of. So that I may iustly expect to be accused of a pragmaticall
ignorance, and bold ostentation, especially since for this opinion
Xenophanes, a man whose authority was able to adde some credit to his
assertion could not escape the like censure from others. For Natales
Comes speaking of that Philosopher,[1] and this his opinion, saith thus,
Nonnulli ne nihil scisse videantur, aliqua nova monstra in Philosophiã
introducunt, ut alicujus rei inventores fuisse appareant.
"Some there are who least they might seeme to know nothing, will
bring up monstrous absurdities in Philosophy, that so afterward they
may bee famed for the invention of somewhat."
The same author doth also in another place accuse Anaxagoras[2] of
folly for the same opinion,
Est enim non ignobilis gradus stultitiæ, vel si nescias quid dicas, tamen
velle de rebus propositis hanc vel illam partem stabilire.
"'Tis none of the worst kindes of folly, boldly to affirme one side or
other, when a man knows not what to say."
[Sidenote 1: Mytholog. lib. 3. c. 17.]
[Sidenote 2: Lib. 7. c. 1.]
If these men were thus censur'd, I may iustly then expect to be derided
by most, and to be believed by few or none; especially since this
opinion seemes to carry in it so much strangenesse, so much
contradiction to the generall