An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume I.

John Locke
ச
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding,?by John Locke

The Project Gutenberg EBook of An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding,
Volume I., by John Locke This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.net
Title: An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume I. MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books I. and II. (of 4)
Author: John Locke
Release Date: January 6, 2004 [EBook #10615]
Language: English
Character set encoding: ASCII
*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HUMANE UNDERSTANDING, V1 ***

Produced by Steve Harris and David Widger

AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMANE UNDERSTANDING
IN FOUR BOOKS
BY JOHN LOCKE
Quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias, quam ista effutientem nauseare, atque ipsum sibi displicere. --Cic. De Natur. Deor. 1. i.
LONDON
Printed by Eliz. Holt, for Thomas Basset, at the George in Fleet Street, near St. Dunstan's Church.
MDCXC

CONTENTS: [Based on the 2d Edition]
EPISTLE DEDICATORY TO THE EARL OF PEMBROKE
THE EPISTLE TO THE READER
INTRODUCTION
BOOK I. NEITHER PRINCIPLES NOR IDEAS ARE INNATE.
I. NO INNATE SPECULATIVE PRINCIPLES II. NO INNATE PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES III. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING INNATE PRINCIPLES, BOTH SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL

BOOK II. OF IDEAS.
I. OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL II. OF SIMPLE IDEAS III. OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSATION IV. IDEA OF SOLIDITY V. OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF DIVERS SENSES VI. OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF REFLECTION ... VII. OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF BOTH SENSATION AND REFLECTION VIII. SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSATION IX. OF PERCEPTION X. OF RETENTION XI. OF DISCERNING, AND OTHER OPERATIONS OF THE MIND XII. OF COMPLEX IDEAS XIII. OF SIMPLE MODES:--AND FIRST, OF THE SIMPLE MODES OF THE IDEA OF SPACE XIV. IDEA OF DURATION AND ITS SIMPLE MODES XV. IDEAS OF DURATION AND EXPANSION, CONSIDERED TOGETHER XVI. IDEA OF NUMBER AND ITS SIMPLE MODES XVII. OF THE IDEA OF INFINITY XVIII. OF OTHER SIMPLE MODES XIX. OF THE MODES OF THINKING XX. OF MODES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN XXI. OF THE IDEA OF POWER XXII. OF MIXED MODES XXIII. OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES XXIV. OF COLLECTIVE IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES XXV. OF IDEAS OF RELATION XXVI. OF IDEAS OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, AND OTHER RELATIONS XXVII. OF IDEAS OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY XXVIII. OF IDEAS OF OTHER RELATIONS XXIX. OF CLEAR AND OBSCURE, DISTINCT AND CONFUSED IDEAS XXX. OF REAL AND FANTASTICAL IDEAS XXXI. OF ADEQUATE AND INADEQUATE IDEAS XXXII. OF TRUE AND FALSE IDEAS XXXIII. OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS
TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE AND MONTGOMERY, BARON HERBERT OF CARDIFF LORD ROSS, OF KENDAL, PAR, FITZHUGH, MARMION, ST. QUINTIN, AND SHURLAND;
LORD PRESIDENT OF HIS MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL; AND LORD LIEUTENANT OF THE COUNTY OF WILTS, AND OF SOUTH WALES.
MY LORD,
This Treatise, which is grown up under your lordship's eye, and has ventured into the world by your order, does now, by a natural kind of right, come to your lordship for that protection which you several years since promised it. It is not that I think any name, how great soever, set at the beginning of a book, will be able to cover the faults that are to be found in it. Things in print must stand and fall by their own worth, or the reader's fancy. But there being nothing more to be desired for truth than a fair unprejudiced hearing, nobody is more likely to procure me that than your lordship, who are allowed to have got so intimate an acquaintance with her, in her more retired recesses. Your lordship is known to have so far advanced your speculations in the most abstract and general knowledge of things, beyond the ordinary reach or common methods, that your allowance and approbation of the design of this Treatise will at least preserve it from being condemned without reading, and will prevail to have those parts a little weighed, which might otherwise perhaps be thought to deserve no consideration, for being somewhat out of the common road. The imputation of Novelty is a terrible charge amongst those who judge of men's heads, as they do of their perukes, by the fashion, and can allow none to be right but the received doctrines. Truth scarce ever yet carried it by vote anywhere at its first appearance: new opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other reason but because they are not already common. But truth, like gold, is not the less so for being newly brought out of the mine. It is trial and examination must give it price, and not any antique fashion; and though it be not yet current by the public stamp, yet it may, for all that, be as old as nature, and is certainly not the less genuine. Your lordship
Continue reading on your phone by scaning this QR Code

 / 190
Tip: The current page has been bookmarked automatically. If you wish to continue reading later, just open the Dertz Homepage, and click on the 'continue reading' link at the bottom of the page.